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Article 5

Secrecy and Genetics in
Adoption Law and Practice
Demosthenes A. Lorandos*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Tens of thousands of children are adopted in America every year.
The state helps create these new families with the intent of fostering the
needs of the child, the birth parents, the adoptive parents, and the community. To serve these needs, accurate health and genetic information
is vital.
Forty-one states currently provide, to varying degrees, for the collection of health information from birth parents and the release of such
information to adoptive families.2 Adoption specialists have praised
the existing legislation, but have also offered critical suggestions for
improving and strengthening the information collection and dissemination process.3 While these laws have obvious practical benefits,4 no
attempt has been made to justify their passage from a theoretical or
jurisprudential basis.
This Article discusses health and genetic issues in adoption and
describes the rights that children and their adoptive parents have to
accurate health and genetic information. First, this Article establishes
that health and genetic information can provide numerous benefits to
* Dr. Demosthenes Lorandos is both an attorney and a clinical psychologist. He is
the president of Consultants in Behavioral Science and Law, located in Ann Arbor,
Michigan.
1. Barbara Kantiowitz, Defying Simple Slogans, NEWSWEEK, May 1, 1989, at 36.
Commentators agree that, because so many "private" (non-governmental) adoptions
occur, it is difficult to quantify exact adoptions statistics. Id. (noting that although
"nobody knows exactly how many adoptions there are each year[,] most experts put the
figure at about 50,000").
2. Paula K. Bebensee, Note, In the Best Interests of Children and Adoptive Parents:
The Need for Disclosure, 78 IOWA L. REV. 397, 404 n.65 (1993).
3. D. Marianne B. Blair, Lifting the Genealogical Veil: A Blueprint for Legislative
Reform of the Disclosure of Health-Related Information in Adoption, 70 N.C. L. REV.
681, 715 (1992) (discussing how commentators have criticized the placement of
"special needs" adoptive children without proper background testing, proper
preparation, and information about recessive problems that may show up later in the
child's life) (citations omitted).
4. Id. at 699-700 (explaining the benefits of full disclosure of medical and social
history).
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the physical and mental health of adopted children. 5 Then, it briefly
reviews the history of adoption law and existing legislation providing
for the collection and dissemination of an adopted child's health and
genetic information.6 Next, the Article determines whether the status
of a "right," as defined by philosophers Wesley Hohfeld and Lawrence Becker, should be placed upon accessing genetic information in
adoption settings.7 A brief review of case law tracing the history and
development of children's rights in the United States follows. 8 Next,
this Article discusses the use of the state's parens patriae and police
powers to further the state's interest in the child's welfare, as well as
the constitutional limitations thereon. 9 This Article then uses the above
information to argue that the need for genetic and health information
has created a right for adopted children and their families to such
information.'0 This Article also argues that the state has a corresponding duty, which can be fulfilled under the proper exercise of its parens
patriae and police powers, to collect and provide such information."
This Article concludes that legislation providing for the collection of
genetic and health information properly
recognizes the state's duties to
2
protect and enforce these rights.
II. HEALTH AND GENETIC ISSUES IN ADOPTION
Adopted children and adoptive families can learn vital information
about an adopted child's heritage from two main sources: (1) the
health histories of an adopted child and the birth parents, and (2) the
genetics of an adopted child. Research in both areas has produced data
of vital importance to child rearing. This Part establishes that health
and genetic information can provide numerous benefits to the physical
and mental health of adopted children.
A. Health Issues in Adoption: What Can We Know?
In the last fifty years, science has made great strides in neonatology.' 3 For example, research has found that in 1987, the number of
See infra part 11.
See infra part 111.
See infra part IV.
See infra part V.A-B.
See infra part V.B.
See infra part V.C.
See infra part V.D.
See infra part VI.
Neonatology is "the study and science of the newborn up to 2 months of age post
natally." GOULD MEDICAL DICTIONARY 896 (Alfonso R. Gennaro, et al. eds.,1979).
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
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children born addicted to crack almost doubled from the previous
year 14 and sharply increased again in the first four months of 1988.1'
Children born with a crack addiction suffer severe withdrawal symptoms, from which many children die a painful death.' 6 If they survive,
they often suffer from irritability, sleep disturbance, high-pitched crying, tremors, and damage to the reticular activating systems of their
brains. 7 The long-term effects of this tragedy are just beginning to be
seen in serious behavior pathology, hyperactivity, and learning dysfunction.' 8
Babies addicted to crack are only one example of the many significant health issues that affect child rearing and adoption. Proper diagnosis, treatment, and planning, however, can overcome problems with
babies addicted to crack,' 9 as well as some of the other problematic
maternal health issues, such as age, nutrition, emotional health, and
medical care. 20 Access to quality medical care and proper prenatal care
also substantially affect fetal development.2 '
Extremes of maternal age can have a serious impact on the health of
a child. Children of older mothers have a disproportionately high rate
14. Richard Levine, More Infants Showing Signs of Narcotics, N.Y. TIMES, April 1,
1988, at BI, B3 (noting that 2521 children were born addicted to crack in the fiscal year
ending in June 1987, as opposed to 1325 in the previous fiscal year).
15. Id. (noting that 1336 children were born addicted to crack in the first four months
of fiscal year 1988).
16. See Rachel Eisenstein, PrenatalHealth Care: Today's Solution to the Future's
Loss, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 467, 469-70 (1991) (explaining that crack-addicted infants
often suffer prenatal strokes, experience a higher than normal rate of kidney and
respiratory disorders, and have a higher incidence of mental retardation) (footnotes
omitted).
17. See generally CAREL B. GERMAIN, HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT:
AN ECOLOGICAL VIEW 173-74 (1991) (listing the symptoms from which crack babies
suffer).
18. Joyce L. Terres, Prenatal Cocaine Exposure: How Should the Government
Intervene?, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 61, 68-69 (1990) (discussing the long-term effects of
maternal cocaine abuse on the behavior and learning ability of victimized children).
19. See Eisenstein, supra note 16, at 485 (indicating that "early and continuous
prenatal health care will save lives").
20. David T. Morris, Cost Containment and Reproductive Autonomy: Prenatal
Genetic Screening and The American Health Security Act of 1993, 20 AM. J. L. & MED.
295, 301 (1994) (describing prenatal screening's ability to reduce disease and infant
mortality).
2 1. The greatest cause of infant death is premature birth. Jennifer Stokley, Note,
Withdrawing or Withholding Medical Care from Premature Infants: Who Should Decide,
and How?, 70 N.D. L. REV. 129, 129 (1994) (citing TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 1585 (17th ed. 1993)). Premature births, often resulting from teenage
pregnancy and poor nutrition, is also one of the leading causes of cerebral palsy. See
NEVILLE F. HACKER & J. GEORGE MOORE, ESSENTIALS OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY
152 (2d ed. 1992).

280

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 27

of Down's Syndrome.22 Babies born to teenage mothers face risks of
substantially lower child birth weights and deficient intrauterine environments.23 Research suggests that teenage mothers run a higher than
normal risk of having babies that face improper meiosis,

birth.25

24

premature

delivery, and even death shortly after
Maternal nutrition also has a direct impact on the health of the fetus.
Pregnant women who suffer from proteinuria 26 give birth to children
who perform substantially lower on a variety of neurological tests than
children born to women without proteinuria.27 Pregnant women who
eat an enriched diet 28 give birth to children who score significantly
higher on standardized measures of cognitive ability than children born
to mothers who do not eat an enriched diet.29 In addition to intellectual
deficits, researchers have linked maternal nutrition to premature
33
32
birth,3 ° growth retardation,3 ' low birth weight, and stillbirths.
22. See generally LINDA F. ANNIS, THE CHILD BEFORE BIRTH 152-53 (1978)
(explaining that a 40-year-old pregnant woman is 10 times more likely to give birth to a
Down's Syndrome baby than a 25-year-old woman).
23. See id. at 85 (indicating that teenage mothers are more likely to bear children
with low birth weights and significant abnormalities due to the young mother's
"inadequately developed reproductive system").
24. Meiosis is necessary for proper development. Meiosis is "a special method of
cell division, occurring in maturation of the sex cells, by means of which each daughter
nucleus receives half the number of chromosomes characteristic of the somatic cells of
the species." DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 789 (26th ed. 1981).
Without proper meiosis, chromosomal abnormalities will cause "abnormal development
such as occurs with Down's Syndrome." KEITH L. MOORE, THE DEVELOPING HUMAN:
CLINICALLY ORIENTED EMBRYOLOGY 13-14 (4th ed. 1988).
25. See ANNIS, supra note 22, at 85-86.
26. Proteinuria is a loss of protein similar in effect to a low protein diet or a protein
deficiency usually resulting from an underlying kidney disease. Vincent Dennis,
Investigation of Renal Function, in CECIL TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 492 (James B.
Wyngaarden et al. eds., 1992).
27. Arthur L. Rosenbaum et al., Neuropsychologic Outcome of Children Whose
Mothers Had ProteinuriaDuring Pregnancy: A Report From the Collaborative Study of
Cerebral Palsy, 33 OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 118, 118-23 (1969).
28. RUTH F. HARRELL ET AL., THE EFFECT OF MOTHERS' DIETS ON THE INTELLIGENCE OF
OFFSPRING: A STUDY OF THE INFLUENCE OF VITAMIN SUPPLEMENTATION OF THE DIETS OF
PREGNANT AND LACTATING WOMEN ON THE INTELLIGENCE OF THEIR CHILDREN 23 (1995);

Ruth F. Harrell, along with other experimenters, conducted a study in which the womens'
diets were enriched by vitamins A, B, and C (which include ascorbic acid, thiamine,
riboflavin, and niacinamide) and iron. Id.
29. Harrell concluded that there was a "significantly greater mean intelligent quotient
for the children" of women who enriched their diets with vitamin supplements, as
opposed to those women who were given placebo tablets. Id. at 43.
30. Id. at 8 (stating that the incidence of premature births was greater for women who
had poor diets).
31. Julie A. Miller, The Little Babies, 124 SCI. NEWS 250, 250 (1983) (listing
malnutrition as a factor associated with the heightened risk of a pregnant woman having
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In addition to the foregoing physical factors, a woman's emotional
health can have a strong effect on infant gestation and development.
When pregnant women become upset, fetal activity often increases and
birth weight may decline.34 Research has revealed a greater incidence
of behavioral disorders and chronic illness among the children of
women who are under stress during pregnancy." Other research has
found strong correlations between maternal emotions and infant eating
difficulties, birth size, and vomiting.36
More subtle factors affecting the health of infants include the effects
of specific teratogens, such as diseases, radiation, and drugs. 37 Maternal diseases such as rubella (measles), syphilis, scarlet fever, and
pneumonia can cause death, blindness, and brain damage to a child.38
40
Mumps and toxoplasmosis 39 can cause heart damage and death.
Mothers with herpes often give birth to infants with malformations and
mental handicaps.4 ' Women with AIDS can transmit the virus to a
fetus, which often is not detected until the antibodies are discovered in
the newborn's blood.4 2 Noninfectious maternal teratogens, such as
a growth-retarded baby).
32. Julie A. Miller, Toward Gene Therapy: Lesch-Nyman Syndrome. 124 Sci. NEWS
89, 90-91 (1983).
33. JAMES G. HUGHES, SYNOPSIS OF PEDIATRICS 158 (5th ed. 1980).
34. Lester W. Sontag, Implications of Fetal Behavior and Environment for Adult
Personality, 134 ANNALS N. Y. ACAD. SCI., 782, 782-86 (1986).
35. See Stuart A. Copans, Human Prenatal Effects: Methodological Problems and
Some Suggested Solutions, 20 MERRILL-PALMER Q. 43, 43-50 (1974) (discussing how
infants born to mothers who suffer from stress during pregnancy cry for significantly
longer periods during their first few days of life than infants born to mothers who
suffered no stress during pregnancy).
36. FREDERIC BRIMBLECOMBE & DONALD BARLTROP, CHILDREN IN HEALTH AND DISEASE

19-23 (1978); HUGHES, supra note 33, at 56-85.
37. A teratogen is "any environmental or chemical agent that causes abnormal
development of the fetus." IDA DOX ET. AL., MELLONI'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 470 (1985). Scholars Thomas Sheppard and Ronald Lemire note that
"Teratogen" (from the Greek word teras ("monster")) derived its name because radiation,
drugs, chemicals, and viruses can have "monstrous" effects on the developing fetus.
Thomas H. Sheppard & Ronald J. Lemire, Teratology, in FETAL AND MATERNAL MEDICINE
403, 403-17 (E. J. Quilligan & Norman Kretchmer, eds. 1980). For an explanation of
the effects of teratogen generally, see id.
38. MOORE, supra note 24, at 151-52.
39. Toxoplasmosis is a cosmopolitan disease that occurs in all mammals and birds
and may be transmitted congenitally. Henry Masur, Toxoplasmosis, in CECIL TEXTBOOK
OF MEDICINE 1987-88 (James B. Wyngaarden et al. eds., 1992)
40. Id. at 1988.
41. See MOORE, supra note 24, at 152.
42. Vaccine Tested to Keep AIDS Virus From Fetus, SEA1TLE TIMES, May 8, 1993, at
A9. In 1987, over 1600 babies born in New York City died within their first year. Jane
Gross, Cocaine and AIDS in New York Add to Infant Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, February 13,
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anemia, diabetes, and phenylketonuria (PKU), can cause serious
damage, including small brain size and respiratory problems. 43 Exposure to environmental teratogens such as radiation and mercury can
cause severe malformations, brain damage, and death. 4" Illegal drugs,
however, are the most prevalent and most immediately damaging
maternal teratogen, as well as the most preventable. 45
An expectant mother's voluntary drug abuse can cause the most
severe and long-term harm to her child.46 Amphetamines have been
linked to fetal heart damage and circulatory malformations. 7 LSD
may cause severe chromosomal damage.48 Babies born to heroin
users suffer clearly recognizable withdrawal symptoms and often
die. 49 Heroin use by pregnant women also has long term effects, such
as hyperactivity and learning dysfunction. Pregnant women being
treated for heroin use with methadone give birth to children who have
even more serious problems."
No socially accepted drug causes more complications in pregnancy
than alcohol. 2 Fetal Alcohol Syndrome severely affects children's
1988, at I. Thirty-seven of these babies died of AIDS. Id.
43. See HACKER & MOORE, supra note 21, at 204-05, 211. Phenylketonuria, or PKU,
is a rare genetic anomaly, which occurs in humans and is marked by the "inability to
oxidize phenylpyruvic acid"-a crystalline acid-and "by severe mental deficiency."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1696 (1986).
44. See MOORE, supra note 24, at 152.
45. See infra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
46. See generally DAVID M. BRODZINSKY ET AL., LIFESPAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 65-67
(3d ed. 1986), GuY R. LEFRANCOIS, THE LIFESPAN 136-37 (3d ed. 1990), and DAVID
MOSHMAN ET AL., DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: A TOPICAL APPROACH 198, 200-01
(1987) for detailed discussions of maternal drug use and the resulting effects on the fetus.
47. See HACKER & MOORE, supra note 21, at 195.
48. Some research has shown that LSD can cause chromosomal damage, but
researchers still debate this finding. See, e.g., Family Matters, THE DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Aug. 3, 1992, at 5C (noting that "[fleared chromosomal damage from LSD has not
been confirmed").
49. Reuben E. Kron et al., Behavior of Infants Born to Narcotic-Dependant Mothers:
Effects of Prenatal and Postnatal Drugs, in DRUG ABUSE IN PREGNANCY AND NEONATAL
EFFECTS 129, 131 (Dr. Josd L. Rementeria, M.D., ed. 1979). The withdrawal symptoms
include hyperactivity, hyperirritability, rapid respiration, vomiting, trembling,
perspiring, fevers, and shrill crying. Id. at 130-31.
50. Gina B. Kolata, Behavioral Teratology: Birth Defects of the Mind, 202 SCIENCE
732, 733 (1978) (stating that babies born to heroin-addicted mothers are "behaviorally
disturbed from birth," possess short attention spans, and "tend to be hyperactive").
51. In fact, children born addicted to methadone seem to show much more serious
withdrawal than infants suffering from neonatal heroin withdrawal, with longer term
negative consequences. Helen L. Johnson et al., 24-Month Neurobehavioral Follow-Up
of Children of Methadone-Maintained Mothers, 7 INFANT BEHAV. & DEV. 115, 115
(1984).
52. See LINDA HUGHEY & MELVA WEBER, THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION BOOK
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growth, intelligence, and overall health.13 Researchers believe that
even moderate use of alcohol during pregnancy can cause fetal anomalies.54
Thus, the pregnancy and birth processes can play a crucial role in an
adoptee's life and health. Similarly, neglect and abuse dramatically
affect an adoptee. 5 Every day, children are beaten, burned, choked,
neglected, sexually abused, and murdered. 6 Many of the children
who survive such abuse and neglect are subsequently adopted. 7
Child abuse cripples children's efforts to realize his or her full potential
as a human being.58 Children in lower socio-economic levels face a
disproportionate rate of abuse 9 and a greater probability of being
placed for adoption. 60 Many of these children enter their new families
OF WOMANCARE 87-88 (1982) (detailing the vast complications even small amounts of
alcohol can cause).
53. Sterling K. Clarren & David W. Smith, The Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, 298 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1063, 1065-66 (1978). See also Henry L. Rosett & Louis W. Sander,
Effects of Maternal Drinking on Neonatal Morphology and State Regulation, in
HANDBOOK OF INFANT DEVELOPMENT 809 (Joy D. Osofsky ed., 1979) (outlining the

impairments Fetal Alcohol Syndrome can cause, including low birth weight and brain
damage).
In the last 15 years, research has found alcohol use to be associated with permanent
growth retardation both before and after birth, smaller brains, disfigured facial features,
mental retardation, and heart and liver malformation. See, e.g., Ernest L. Abel, Fetal
Alcohol Syndrome: Behavioral Teratology, 87 PSYCHOL. BULL. 29, 29, 31-33, 44
(1980) (discussing the physical and cognitive impairments caused by the Fetal Alcohol
Syndrome); Robert . Sokol et al., Alcohol Abuse During Pregnancy: An Epidemiologic
Study, 4 ALCOHOLISM 135, 135 (1980) (noting the principal features and defects of Fetal
Alcohol Syndrome).
Children born to heavy drinkers often suffer from continuing mental and growth
retardation throughout their lives. P. J.Bolton, Drugs of Abuse, in DRUGS AND
PREGNANCY: HUMAN TERATOGENESIS AND RELATED PROBLEMS 128, 135-36 (D. F. Hawkins

ed., 1983). Many children born to alcoholic mothers suffer withdrawal symptoms such
as inability to sleep, increased yawning, sneezing, and hyperirritability. Id. at 136.
54. See generally Bolton, supra note 53, at 129, 135-37 (acknowledging that people
have known for centuries that alcohol can cause damage to the fetus); HUGHEY & WEBER,
supra note 52, at 87 (noting that alcohol readily passes through the placenta into the
fetus's blood stream and therefore has disastrous effects).
55. See ANDREA SALTZMAN & KATHLEEN PROCH, LAW IN SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE 20205 (1990).
56. See generally DAVID BAKAN, SLAUGHTER OF THE INNOCENTS 1-25 (1971)
(describing the abuse of children and how society often looks the other way).
57. See Blair, supra note 3, at 700-01 (illustrating that many abused children are
subsequently adopted).
58. Edward Zigler & Nancy Rubin, Why Child Abuse Occurs, PARENTS MAG., Nov.
1985, at 102, 104.
59. See generally id. at 106-07 (illustrating that a disproportionate number of
abusive parents come from low income families, which have far greater levels of stress
than middle or upper class families).
60. See, e.g., James Garbarino, The Human Ecology of Child Maltreatment: A
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with serious psychological problems, unbeknownst to their adoptive
families.6 '
Long-term studies of adults who were abused as infants reveal a
high correlation between serious child abuse and multiple personality
disorder. 62 Adults who were sexually abused as children are more
likely to later abandon their own spouses and children. 63 Any adoption process that fails to consider these important findings disserves
the interests of all concerned.
B. Genetic Issues in Adoption
Just as they can learn volumes from health histories, adopted children and adoptive families can learn vital information from the genetics
of an adopted child.6 Therefore, these children and their adoptive
families have a critical interest in the child's genetic information.65
Genetic trait transmission research has revealed strong genetic links to
such divergent qualities as "activity level, alcoholism, anxiety, criminality, dominance, extraversion, intelligence, locus of control, manicdepressive psychosis, political attitudes, schizophrenia, sexuality, sociability, values, and vocational interests." 66 An explosion of genetic
research in the last fifteen years has produced data of vital importance
to child rearing.67 Curiously, while the most useful information has
been developed in adoption studies, the adoption process has least
utilized this information.'

Conceptual Model for Research, 39 J.MARRIAGE & FAMILY 721, 726-27 (1977)
(illustrating that abused children are often left without a "support system").
61. See Blair, supra note 3, at 684 (recognizing the long-standing policy of many
states to provide little or no information on the medical or social history of an adopted
child).
62. See Sally Koblinsky & Nory Behana, Child Sexual Abuse: The Educator's Role in
Prevention, Detection, and Intervention, YOUNG CHILDREN, Sept. 1984, at 3, II
(explaining that child abuse can often be evidenced through personality disorders, such
as behavior change, low self-esteem, and withdrawal from friends).
63. See, e.g., TOMMIE J. HAMMER & PAULINE TURNER, PARENTING IN CONTEMPORARY
SOCIETY 298 (1996) (noting that adults who were abused as children had far greater
difficulty in parenting their own children).
64. See infra notes 69-118 and accompanying text.
65. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
66. Constance Holden, Does Biology Make Personality, WASH POST., Sept. 27,
1987, at D3.
67. Deborah Franklin, What a Child is Given, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 3, 1989, at 36,
38-41; Robert Plomin, The Role of Inheritance in Behavior, SCIENCE, Apr. 13, 1990, at
183, 185-86 [hereinafter Plomin, Inheritance].
68. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
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There are four basic periods in the history of behavioral genetics.
The first began with Gregor Mendel's work on trait inheritance. 69 The
second period began with the theory that genes are found in objects
called chromosomes, which are found in cell nuclei.70 The third period began when researchers explained the role of deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA). 7'
During this third period, scientists gained the capability to predict
and diagnose genetic dysfunctions by using DNA mapping techniques. 7 Three basic classes of these dysfunctions have been categorized: chromosomal diseases, hereditary diseases with simple "Mendelian" modes of inheritance, and multifactorial diseases."
These genetic dysfunctions affect a substantial number of people.
More than five percent of persons under twenty-five years of age
suffer from genetic dysfunctions caused by microscopic deviations in
the structure or number of their chromosomes. 4 While chromosomal
diseases are relatively rare, all humans carry genes that can produce
severe handicaps.' 5 Many researchers believe that the number of
69. Mendel published his experimental results in 1866 in a paper printed by the
Natural History Society of Brno. Genetically Speaking, PEORIA J.STAR, Jan. 10, 1994,
at D2. Mendel described dominant and recessive transmission strength in certain traits
in peas, which determined the smooth or wrinkled character of coverings. Gregor
Mendel's Experiments on Plant Hybrids, SCIENCE, July 7, 1993, at 370. The
mechanism by which this dominant or recessive strength is activated is now called a
gene. Id. at 371.
For an explanation of genetics in human development, see Arno G. Motulsky &
Gilbert S. Omenn, Special Award Lecture: Biochemical Genetics and Psychiatry, in
GENETIC RESEARCH IN PSYCHIATRY 3, 4-7 (Ronald R. Fieve et al. eds., 1975).
70. MARGARET

W.

THOMPSON

ET AL., GENETICS IN MEDICINE

I

(5th ed. 1991)

(providing an introduction that details the development of genetics research and its role
in medicine). It has been estimated that each of a human being's 23 chromosomes
contains between 50,000 and 100,000 genes. See Yvonne Baskin, Spare Genes:
Tampering with Human Embryos, OMNI, Mar. 1982, at 52, 54, 109-14.
7 1. See THOMPSON, supra note 70, at 2.
72. See generally id. at 3 (recognizing that the expansion and application of genetic
knowledge has had "fruitful consequences").
73. See generally id. at 4-5 (providing a table categorizing diseases under the three
main classes of dysfunction).
74. Id. at 8. One of the most prevalent aberrations is trisomy 21, commonly known
as Down's Syndrome. See id. at 219. Down's Syndrome children suffer from heart
defects and face slower physical and intellectual development. Id. They usually do not
live past their third decade. Id. Other genetic dysfunctions include "Cri du chat." Id. at
226-27. "Cri du chat" is a hereditary condition marked by smallness of the head and jaw,
severe mental deficiency, and a characteristic high-pitched, cat-like cry. Id. at 226.
Another aberration is Kleinfelter's Syndrome, which is caused by the presence of an
extra X-chromosome in a male child and causes feminization and infertility. Id. at 239.
Turner's Syndrome, which most often occurs in women missing a chromosome and
causes masculinization and infertility, is a fourth aberration. Id. at 241.
75. Id. at 8.
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"Mendelian" mode inheritable diseases exceeds 1800.76 While the total
7
number of genetic dysfunctions is staggering, many are detectable.7
More than 200 of the most devastating genetically transmitted
diseases, including spina bifida, all known chromosomal abnormalities, and over seventy metabolic dysfunctions, 78 can be detected
through amniocentesis. 79 Ultrasound, fetoscopy, cytogenetics, and
chorionic villus sampling, can also detect genetic dysfunctions. 80 Unfortunately, many pregnant women whose children will be placed for
adoption severely underutilize these procedures: Recent "wrongful
life" and "wrongful adoption" cases evidence the extent to which simple and available tests to obtain genetic information are not used. 8'
The fourth period of behavioral genetic history began in earnest in
the 1980s with research into the genetic transmission of personality
traits and characteristics. 82 This period revolutionized the "naturenurture" controversy,83 and has had a profound impact on pediatric
76. See, e.g., VICTOR A. McKUsICK, MENDALIAN INHERITANCE IN MAN XXXi-XXXViii
(7th ed. 1986).
77. THADDEUS E. KELLY, CLINICAL GENETICS AND GENETIC COUNSELING 370 (1986)

(explaining that amniocentesis can detect multifactorial genetic diseases).
78. THOMPSON, supra note 70, at 414-15;.HAROLD KAPLAN AND BENJAMIN SADOCK,
COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY IV 1359 (1985)
79. Amniocentesis is a testing procedure in which a small amount of amniotic fluid is
withdrawn from the womb and analyzed. Dox, supra note 37, at 14; THOMPSON, supra
note 70, at 427.
80. See KELLY, supra note 77, at 372.
81. See, e.g., Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1433-34 (5th Cir. 1990)
(explaining that an adoption agency failed to obtain important genetic information).
For a general overview of "wrongful life" and "wrongful adoption" cases and tests
available to obtain genetic information, see James Bopp, Jr. et al., The "Rights" and
"Wrongs" of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life: A JurisprudentialAnalysis of Birth
Related Torts, 27 DuQ. L. REV. 461 (1989); Kristin Hackett, The Fragile X Omen:
Scientific Advances Compel A Legislative Treatment of Wrongful Life and Wrongful
Birth, 2 J.L. & TECH. 249, 253-68 (1987); Wanda K. Lemna et al., Mutation Analysis
for Heterozygote Detection and the Prenatal Diagnosis of Cystic Fibrosis, 322 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 291, 298-302 (1990); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Human
Genetics, 39 EMORY L.J. 697 (1990); Janet L. Tucker, Wrongful Life: A New Generation,
27 J. FAM. L. 673 (1989); John Ellemert, Supreme Judicial Court Backs Adoption
Verdict; Couple Awarded Damages for Withheld Family History, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug.
15, 1995 at 15; Joyzelle Davis, Birth Defect Prompts Law Suit, ORANGE COUNTY REG.,
Dec. 28, 1995, at BI.
82. See Genes, Environment, and Personality, SCIENCE, June 17, 1994, at 1700;
What Makes Them Do It?, TIME, Jan. 15, 1996, at 60 (stating that scientists believe
they will eventually have the ability "to genetically map personality traits as precisely
as ... physical characteristics like height and weight").

83. The "nature-nurture" controversy began in the psychology field with Granville
Stanley Hall's "genetic psychology" in the late 1800s. See WILLIAM SAHAKIAN, HISTORY
AND SYSTEMS OF PSYCHOLOGY 71(1975). Hall relied heavily upon the work of Darwin and
Spencer and postulated a strong genetic influence upon human psychology. Id. This
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and developmental psychology. By studying trait and characteristic
transmission. between generations, researchers have made startling discoveries.
Studies of twins who were raised separately have provided behavioral genetics researchers the opportunity to separate genetic from environmental effects. 84 This is particularly true in cases of identical
twins, who share the same genetic material.85 Descriptions of genetic
predispositions to specific traits best explain similarities between twins
reared apart.86 A number of detailed adoption studies have enabled
researchers to apply sophisticated correlational analyses to studies of
adopted children in their new homes.87 When researchers correlate
this data with detailed studies of the twins' adoptive and biological
parents, researchers can determine separate genetic 8and
environmental
8
influences for a number of traits and characteristics.
For example, researchers have conclusively proven genetic links to
schizophrenia.89 Virtually all genetic researchers urge parents to use
"genetic psychology" was a radical departure from the concept of the mind as a blank
tablet ("tabula rasa") upon which experience wrote, a theory postulated by John Locke in
his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Id. (citing John Locke, AN ESSAY
CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, book 2, ch. 1 (1690)).
The controversy was re-ignited recently by Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles A.
Murray by their book, The Bell Curve. See RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES A.
MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE:

INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE

See, e.g., Debra A. Poole, The Two Bell Curves, 39 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST
35, 35-42 (1995); ROBERT PLOMIN, GENETICS AND EXPERIENCE: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN
NATURE AND NURTURE (1994) [hereinafter PLOMIN, GENETICS AND EXPERIENCE]; DAVID C.
ROWE, THE LIMITS OF FAMILY INFLUENCE 2-4 (1994).
84. Thomas J. Bouchard et al., Sources of Human Psychological Differences: The
Minnesota Study of Twins Reared Apart, SCIENCE, Oct. 12, 1990, at 223, 223-228;
PLOMIN, GENETICS AND EXPERIENCE, supra note 83, at 62-68; ROWE, supra note 83, at 7073.
85. ROBERT PLOMIN ET AL., BEHAVIORAL GENETICS: A PRIMER 341 (1980) [hereinafter
PLOMIN, PRIMER]; Bouchard, supra note 84, at 223-24.
86. PLOMIN, PRIMER, supra note 85, at 342-53.
87. See, e.g., Remi J. Cadoret et al., Studies of Adoptees from Psychiatrically
Disturbed Biological Parents: III Medical Symptoms and Illnesses in Childhood and
Adolescence, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1316, 1318 (1976) (explaining how researchers
compared adoptees with psychiatrically ill (predominantly schizophrenic) biological
parents with adoptees from biological parents free from pathology and found
significantly higher rates of psychiatric illness in adoptees from biologically ill
parents, regardless of environmental factors in adoptive homes); Lynn Cunningham et
al., Studies of Adoptees from Psychiatrically Disturbed Biological Parents: Psychiatric
Conditions in Childhood and Adolescence, 126 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 534, 549 (1975)
(explaining that researchers found higher rates of psychiatric dysfunction in adoptees
whose biological parents had psychiatric disturbances).
88. Cadoret, supra note 87, at 1318; Donald L. Goodwin, Alcoholism and Genetics,
42 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 171, 171-74 (1985).
89. Literally hundreds of studies have traced the genetic causation of schizophrenia.
(1994).
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this data in child rearing by understanding a child's genetic predispositions and by planning to cope with foreseeable difficulties. 90 Integrating these findings into the processes by which parents and others
raise high-risk children could thereby help limit the effects of this
debilitating disease.
Research into the genetic etiology of alcoholism and drug abuse
follows a similar path. Numerous twin and adoption studies indicate a
strong genetic link to alcoholism. 9' A subsequent study described
By the mid 1970s, researchers reported a strong genetic predisposition to breakdown in
schizophrenic illness. See, e.g., Cadoret, supra note 87, at 1318.
By the early 1980s, researchers reported strong evidence of a heritability factor in
schizophrenia. See, e.g., Michael Bohman, The Interaction of Heredity and Childhood
Environment: Some Adoption Studies, 22 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY & ALLIED
DISCIPLINES 195, 200 (1981); Seymour S. Kety, Mental Illness in the Biologic and
Adoptive Relatives of Schizophrenic Adoptees: Findings Relevant to Genetic and
Environmental Factors in Etiology, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 720, 727 (1983)
(presenting a detailed review of adoption studies deducing a strong genetic predisposition to schizophrenia); Seymour S. Kety, Schizophrenia Illness in the Families
of Schizophrenic Adoptees: Findings from the Danish National Sample, 14
SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 217, 222 (1988).
By the mid 1980s, researchers from around the world reported a variety of studies of
families, mono and dizygotic twins, and adoption processes, which led to the
inescapable conclusion that schizophrenia had a strong genetic component. See, e.g.,
Robin M. Murray et al., Genetic Vulnerability to Schizophrenia, 9 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS

N. AM. 3. 16 (1986) (describing family, adoption, and twin studies, as well as modes of
transmission theories and molecular genetics).
By the late 1980s, researchers used DNA technology in an attempt to find specific
genetic markers, or "probes," for schizophrenia. See, e.g., Irving I. Gottesman et al.,
Clinical Genetics as Clues to the "Real" Genetics of Schizophrenia, 13 SCHIZOPHRENIA
BULL. 23, 47 (1987). Further research revealed that periventricular atrophy in the third
trimester is a genetically produced defect that brings about the predisposition to
breakdown in schizophrenia. Sarnoff A. Mednick et al., The Copenhagen High-Risk
Project, 1962-86, 13 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 485, 495 (1987).

By the close of the 1980s, a leading psychiatric journal devoted an entire issue to
emerging theories of the genetic transmission of schizophrenia. 21 J. PSYCHIATRIC RES.
365-575 (1987).
90. See, e.g., PLOMIN, GENETICS AND EXPERIENCE, supra note 83, at 82-89; PLOMIN,
PRIMER, supra note 85, at 343; Franklin, supra note 67, at 36-43; Holden, supra note 66,
at D5.
91. In the early 1970s, researchers found that sons of alcoholics raised with their
biological parents and raised by non-alcoholic adoptive parents had comparable rates of
alcoholism. Donald W. Goodwin et al., Drinking Problems in Adopted and Non-Adopted
Sons of Alcoholics, 31 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 164, 166 (1974). See also Donald
W. Goodwin, Genetic Factors in the Development of Alcoholism, 9 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS
N. AM. 427, 428-32 (1986) (citing various international studies linking alcoholism to
genetics); Donald W. Goodwin, The Genetics of Alcoholism, 34 Hosp. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 1031, 1033-34 (1983) (finding adopted sons of alcoholics to be four times
as likely to become alcoholics as adopted sons of non-alcoholics, all other
circumstances being equal).
A study of over 2000 adoptees revealed significant correlations between alcoholic

1996]

Secrecy and Genetics in Adoption Law

strong genetic links in the development of alcoholism, anti-social
personality, and drug abuse.92 By the close of the 1980s, researchers
were investigating the "pharmacogenetics" of psychoactive drugs,9 3 as
well the inheritance of distinct types of alcoholic syndromes. 94 These
researchers stressed the genetic components contributing to the development of alcoholism and other drug abuse, and urged prevention of
these diseases by utilizing their data in informed child rearing practices.95
The most controversial area of recent behavioral genetics research
has been the heritability of intelligence.96 Critics have questioned the
motives of such inquiries. 97 Nonetheless, in the last twenty years,
research has98continually suggested that intelligence has a strong genetic
component.
biological parents and alcoholism in their adopted-away offspring. Michael Bohman,
Some Genetic Aspects of Alcoholism and Criminality: A Population of Adoptees, 35
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 269, 270-71 (1978).
In a follow-up study, Bohman
described two forms of inherited alcoholism. The first was highly heritable, and usually
passed from father to son. Michael Bohman, Maternal Inheritance of Alcohol Abuse:
Cross-Fostering Analysis of Adopted Women. 38 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 965, 96669 (1981). The second affected both male and female adoptees, and is associated with
mild criminality. Id. at 969.
A 1985 study of the Swedish adoption records of over 862 male and 913 female
adoptees similarly described these two distinct types of alcoholism, and further
concluded that both have significant genetic etiologies. Robert Cloninger et al.,
Psychopathology in Adopted-out Children of Alcoholics: The Stockholm Adoption
Study, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS INALCOHOLISM 37, 44 (Mark Galanter, ed., 1985).
92. Remi J. Cadoret et al., Alcoholism and Antisocial Personality: Interrelationships, Genetic and Environmental Factors, 42 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 161,
163-65 (1985); Remi J. Cadoret et al., An Adoption Study of Genetic and Environmental
Factors in Drug Abuse, 43 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1131, 1133 (1986).
93. John 1. Nurnberger, Jr., Pharmacogenetics of Psychoactive Drugs, 21 J.
PSYCHIATRIC RES. 499, 499-503 (1987). Pharmacogenetics is "[tlhe study of genetic
factors that influence an organism's reaction to a drug." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY 1357 (1992).
94. Robert C. Cloninger et al., Genetic Heterogeneity and the Classification of
Alcoholism, 7 ADVANCES ALCOHOL & SUBSTANCE ABUSE 3, 4-15 (1988).
95. See Cadoret, supra note 87, at 1317.
96. See HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 83, at 1. See also Charles A. Murray, The
Real 'Bell Curve,' WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 1994, at A14 (acknowledging the controversial
nature of his book, The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life)
(citing HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 83); Poole, supra note 83, at 35-43; PLOMIN,
PRIMER, supra note 85, at 366 (noting that "although group differences have their place,
we need to avoid slipping into typological traps"); ROWE, supra note 83, at 7-8
(concluding that the family setting may have less influence on a child's intelligence and
social attitudes than the child's genetics).
97. ROWE, supra note 83, at 19-26; HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 83, at I
(noting that the attempt to measure any genetic correlation with intelligence has been
"dismissed as an artifact of racism [and] political reaction").
98. In 1978, researchers published findings that differences in the I.Q.s of
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Many of the same data used to describe the genetic bases of schizophrenia, alcoholism, and drug abuse have also indicated the existence
of strong genetic links to major depressive diseases. 99 Significantly
higher rates of "affective disorders," such as depression and depressive diseases, exist among adoptees whose biological parents exhibit
these disorders. 0 0 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, researchers
found significant genetic links to neurotic depression,'0 ' simple

adolescents studied were due more to genetic than to environmental factors. Sandra Scarr
& Richard A. Weinberg, The Influence of 'Family Background' on Intellectual
Attainment, 43 AM. Soc. REV. 674, 688-91 (1978). Other researchers have come to
similar conclusions. PLOMIN, PRIMER, supra note 85, at 333 (using adoption studies to
show that genetics have a much higher role in intelligence than environment); Rowe,
supra note 83, at 105-11 (same).
In 1989, two scientists attempted to describe heritability issues concerning
intelligence and other factors. See Franklin, supra note 67, at 36; Karen Wright, The
Blood-Brain Barrier: More Evidence Links Genes and Intelligence, SCIENTIFIC AM. 27,
27-28 (1989). Examining 60 years of research into genetics and intelligence, one
scientist concluded that genetics plays a profound role. Wright, supra, at 28. The
second scientist concluded that "[tlhough the debate over the value of intelligence
quotient tests continues ... there is ample evidence that whatever it is they measure is in
large part inherited." Franklin, supra note 67, at 36, 38.
Two 1990 studies that used the sophisticated "methodology of quantitative behavioral
genetics" and "multivariate conditional path models" found significant indicators of
genetic transmission of intelligence. Hilary Coon et al., Home Environment and
Cognitive Ability of 7-year-old Children in the Colorado Adoption Project: Genetic and
Environmental Etiologies, 26 DEV. PSYCHOL. 459, 462-66 (1990).
99. "Major depressive diseases," also called "major affective disorders," refer to a
class of mental disorders ranging from serious to incapacitating depressions. See
KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 78, at 593.
100. Remi J. Cadoret, Evidence for Genetic Inheritance of Primary Affective
Disorder in Adoptees, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 463, 464-66 (1978). See also J.
Mendlewicz, Biological Factors in Affective Disorders and Their Relevance to Lithium
Prophylaxis, 15 PHARMACOPSYCHIATRIA 1I, 12-14 (1982) (finding a greater degree of
psychopathology in genetically related people than in adopted children and their
adopted parents).
A 1986 study compared the relatives of 71 adult adoptees who developed severe mood
disorders with a control group of the relatives of 71 adult adoptees who did not. Paul H.
Wender et al., Psychiatric Disorders in the Biological and Adoptive Families of Adopted
Individuals with Affective Disorders,43 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 923, 929 (1986).
The report noted a significantly increased frequency of major mood disorders, including
unipolar depression, alcohol abuse, and attempted suicide. Id. at 926. The report also
recognized "a striking and significantly increased incidence of successful suicide among
the biological relatives of the [adoptees with serious mood disorders] compared with the
biological relatives of the controls." Id. at 927.
101. George Winokur, Family (Genetic) Studies in Neurotic Depression, 21 J.
PSYCHIATRIC RES. 357, 363 (1987). Neurosis depression is "a depression occurring in
the context of chronic personality problems or neuroses. It occurs in the presence- of
long standing instability in interpersonal relations, sexual, marital and work
circumstances or neurotic symptoms." Id. at 357.
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depression, 10 2 and major depressive disorders. 10 3 Researchers have
begun looking for a specific gene cluster that predisposes people to
bipolar depressions,' and for a genetically transmitted molecular catecholamine in manic-depression.' 0 5 Once again, these researchers have
recommended that child development specialists use their data to better
the lives of at-risk children.'06
As research into the genetic etiology of schizophrenia and alcoholism exploded in the mid- 1970s, forensic psychologists began studying
links between genetics and criminal behavior and found strong evidence of a genetic link to criminal predisposition.'0 7 Additional studies
102. Peter McGuffin et al., Hazard, Heredity and Depression: A Family Study, 21 J.
PSYCHIATRIC RES. 365, 375 (1987). As defined by Dr. Robert Jean Campbell, simple
depression is the first stage of the depressive phase of manic-depressive psychosis.
ROBERT J. CAMPBELL, M.D, PSYCHIATRIC DICTIONARY 192 (1989).
103. Theodore Reich et. al., The Familial Transmission of Primary Major Depressive
Disorder, 21 J. PSYCHIATRIC RES. 613, 624 (1987). A depressive disorder is "a major
subdivision of mood disorders (affective disorders) comprising major depression,
dysthymia, and otherwise unclassified depressions." CAMPBELL, supra note 102, at 194.
104. Daniela S. Gerhard et al., Search for a Gene that PredisposesIndividuals to BPI
Disorder,21 J. PSYCHIATRIC RES. 569, 575 (1987). A bi-polar disorder is an "affective
disorder characterized by episodes of both mania and depression." CAMPBELL, supra note
102, at 194.
105. J. Mallet et al., Molecular Genetics of Catecholamine as an Approach to the
Biochemistry of Manic-Depression, 21 J. PSYCHIATRIC RES. 559, 568 (1987). The
catecholamine ("CA") (a fluid which affects neurotransmitters and hormones) hypothesis
stated that "there is a functional increase in CA during mania and a decrease during
depression." Id. at 559.
Recently, two psychologists reviewed the work done to date in the genetic etiology of
depression and mood disorders, and concluded that the "most ubiquitous of psychiatric
symptoms" are genetically transmitted. Randy Katz & Peter McGuffin, The Genetics of
Depression and Manic-Depressive Disorder, 155 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 294, 304 (1988).
106. See Holden, supra note 66, at D8.
107. A study of female offenders and their adopted-out infants revealed significantly
higher rates of antisocial personality disorder among adoptees of offender mothers.
Raymond R. Crowe, An Adoption Study of Antisocial Personality, 31 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHOL. 785, 791 (1994) [hereinafter Crowe, Adoption Study]. In a subsequent study,
Crowe compared 52 adult adoptees of female offender mothers he studied for 15 to 46
years with a control group.
Raymond R. Crowe, An Adoptive Study of
Psychopathology: Preliminary Results from Arrest Records and Psychiatric Hospital
Records, in GENETIC RESEARCH PSYCHIATRY 96 (Ronald R. Fieve et al. eds., 1975)
[hereinafter Crowe, Psychopathology]. Although there was some criminality in control
group adoptees, the rates of antisocial personality and criminality among the adopted
out children of female offenders were significantly higher. Id. at 98-100. See also
Sarnoff A. Mednick et al., Genetic Influences in Criminal Convictions: Evidence from
an Adoption Cohort, SCIENCE, May 25, 1984, at 891, 894 (finding that a biological
parent's criminality affects children's propensity for criminal behavior).
A study of 800 Swedish adoptees revealed strong correlations for petty criminality
between male adoptee offenders and their biological parents, and concluded that genetics
is a significant factor in the transmission of criminality. See Robert Cloninger et al.,
Predispositionto Petty Criminality in Swedish Adoptees: I Genetic and Environmental
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into the relationship between genetics and criminal behavior revealed
two conclusions.'
First, a significant correlation exists between
adopted children's criminality and that of their biological parents.'9
Second, proper utilization of this information by pediatric and child development specialists would lead to an increased prevention of crime
and delinquency." 0
In addition to these well established areas of genetic inquiry, researchers have found significant genetic factors in a vast array of
human characteristics, including infant temperament,"' blood pressure,"12 obesity," 3 social interaction," 14 panic disorder," 5 "Type-A"
Heterogeneity, 39 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1242, 1247 (1982).
A unique study of antisocial personality compared fathers of adopted and non-adopted
children who were admitted to psychiatric facilities. Mark L. Jary & Mark A. Stewart,
Psychiatric Disorder in the Parents of Adopted Children with Aggressive Conduct
Disorder, 13 NEUROPSYCHOBIOLOGY 7, I1(1985). The study found that the biological
fathers of the adoptees so diagnosed had much higher rates of antisocial behavior and
alcoholism. Id. at 8-9.
By 1987 researchers believed that it was clearly reasonable to "expect that some
biological predisposition toward antisocial behavior may characterize the most serious
of recidivistic and violent criminal offenders." Terrie E. Moffitt, Parental Mental
Disorder and Offspring Criminal Behavior: An Adoption Study, 50 PSYCHIATRY 346, 360
(1987).
108. Laura A. Baker et al., Sex Differences in Property Crime in a Danish Adoption
Cohort, 19 BEHAV. GENETICS 355, 366 (1989); Remi J. Cadoret et al., Genetic and
Environmental Factors in Adoptee Antisocial Personality 239 EUR. ARCHIVES
PSYCHIATRY & NEUROLOGICAL SCI. 231, 240 (1990); Michael Duyme, Antisocial
Behavior and Postnatal Environment: A French Adoption Study, 31 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. &
PSYCHIATRY 699, 710 (1990); Christopher Jencks, Genes & Crime, N.Y. REV., Feb. 12,
1987, at 33, 41.
109. Baker, supra note 108, at 335; Cadoret, supra note 108, at 231; Duyme, supra
note 108, at 699; Jencks, supra note 108, at 33.
110. Jencks, supra note 108, at 35.
I I1. John C. Loehlin, Heredity, Environment, and the Thurstone Temperament
Schedule, 16 BEHAV. GENETICS 61, 76 (1986). For a discussion of temperaments found in
construct of EAS (emotionality, activity, sociability), see Robert Plomin et al., EAS
Temperaments During the Last Half of the Life Span: Twins Reared Apart and Twins
Reared Together, 3 PSYCHOL. & AGING 43, 50 (1988).
112. Pierre Biron et al., Familial Aggregation of Blood Pressure in 558 Adopted
Children, 155 CANADIAN MED. ASS'N J.773, 774 (1976).
113. See, e.g., Pierre Biron et al., Familial Resemblance of Body Weight and
Weight/Height in 374 Homes with Adopted Children, 91 J.PEDIATRICS 555, 558 (1977);
R. Arlen Price et al., Genetic Contributions to Human Fatness: An Adoption Study, 144
AM. J.PSYCHIATRY 1003, 1008 (1987); Albert J.Stunkard et. al., An Adoption Study of
Human Obesity, 314 NEw ENG. J.MED. 193, 198 (1986).
114. David M. Brodzinsky et al., Psychological and Academic Adjustment in Adopted
Children, 52 J.CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 582, 590 (1984). See David R. Owen
& T.W. Teasdale, Social Class and Mobility in Male Adoptees and Non-Adoptees, 16 J.
BIOSOCIAL SCI. 521, 530 (1984) (finding positive correlations between the social
classes of adoptees and their biological and adoptive fathers); T.W. Teasdale et al.,
Social Class in Adopted and Non-Adopted Siblings, 14 BEHAV. GENETICS 587, 593
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behavior," 16 and premature death in adoptees." 17 These researchers
have joined earlier geneticists in urging that prevention can be dramatically enhanced if parents use these findings in their child rearing
practices."'
III. HEALTH INFORMATION DISCLOSURE LEGISLATION: THE NEED
FOR ADEQUATE DISCLOSURE IN THE ADOPTION PROCESS

Adoption laws in the United States historically cloaked the adoption
process in secrecy. State legislatures have responded only recently to
the criticism of the anonymity and secrecy in the adoption process by
enacting laws granting adopted children and their adoptive families
access to relevant health and genetic information. This Part reviews
the history of adoption in the United States and existing legislation
providing for the collection and dissemination of an adopted child's
health and genetic information.
A. The History of Adoption in the United States
The adoption process begins in a quagmire of conflicting interests.
These conflicts may be subtle, as when all parties agree to an adoption,
or overt, as when one party initiates legal proceedings to terminate
parental rights." 9 Four distinct interest groups exist in the adoption
process: birth parents, who may be aligned together or opposed to
each other; adoptive parents who, while seemingly aligned with each
other, come to the adoption process with a variety of conscious and
unconscious motives and goals; the child, whose interests may seem
(1984) (noting that "[t]he social class of adult adoptees is found to correlate with that of
their nonadopted biological full and half siblings, suggesting a genetic contribution to
the determination of social class").
1 15. Fiona K. Judd et al., Panic Disorder: Evidence for Genetic Vulnerability, 21
AUSTRALIAN

& N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 197, 208 (1987). Panic disorder "is characterized by

panic attacks which occur in circumstances other than during marked physical exertion
or in a life-threatening situation and which are not precipitated only be [sic] exposure to
a circumscribed phobic stimulus." CAMPBELL, supra note 102, at 198.
116. Nancy L. Pedersen et. al., Genetic and Environmental Influences for Type A-like
Measures and Related Traits: A Study of Twins Reared Apart and Twins Reared Together,

51 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 428, 440 (1989). Type-A behavior is "a behavior pattern
characterized by anger, impatience, irritation, and aggravation." CAMPBELL, supra note
102, at 781.
117. Thorkild I. A. Sorensen et. al., Genetic and Environmental Influences on
Premature Death in Adult Adoptees, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 727, 732 (1988).
1 18. Judd, supra note 115, at 207; Pederson, supra note 116, at 438; Sorenson, supra

note 117, at 729-31.
119. For discussion of multiple interests in an "open" adoption, see Lincoln Caplan,
An Open Adoption, (pts. I & 2), THE NEW YORKER, May 21, 1990, at 40, and THE NEW
YORKER, May 28, 1990, at 73.
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simple, but grow more complex as time passes; and the state, ostensibly with the simplest interest to serve the best interests of the child,
although the state may attempt to serve too many interests and disserve
most as a result.
Adoption law in the United States has a long and convoluted
history. 120 The Massachusetts legislature enacted the nation's first
adoption law in 185 1.121 Soon thereafter, other states enacted similar
laws, which were little more than attempts to codify a fairly informal
process. 22 As the United States entered the Progressive Era, the
emerging disciplines of sociology and social work affected the actions
of state legislatures. 23 Numerous social problems emerged as thousands of immigrants joined a population that was rapidly moving from
rural to urban areas. 124 Philanthropic and charitable organizations
established schools of philanthropy (now called schools of social
work) in an attempt
to meet the needs of this burgeoning class of urban
25
Americans.1
During the Progressive Era, new adoption laws focused on granting
a "new start" for the state's adoptees, and professional organizations
of social workers championed a number of new regulations. 26 These
reforms were indicative of a united movement supporting strict confidentiality in adoption processes.
Believing that secrecy was necessary to protect birth mothers as well
as the children stigmatized by the "shame of illegitimacy," states en-27
acted laws providing for the complete anonymity of birth parents.
These laws denied adoptees and their families access to information
120. See generally Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Background of the American
Law of Adoption, 11. FAM. L. 443, 445-67 (1971) (examining the history of adoption
law, beginning with the law of Rome and early civilization).
121.

1851 Mass. Acts 324. See PAUL SACHDEV, UNLOCKING THE ADOPTION FILEs 7

(1989).
122. 1873 N.Y. Laws 830.
123. See STEVEN MINTZ & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC REVOLUTIONS: A SOCIAL HISTORY

OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 119-22 (1988). The Progressive Era began in the 1890s and
lasted until the 1930s. See id.
124. Id. at 85-87.
125. See Kim Hopper, The Guru of Giving, THE INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 4, 1993, at
Fl.

126. Joan H. Hollinger, The Aftermath of Adoption: Legal and Social Consequences,
in ADOPTION LAW & PRACTICE 13-A to 13-6 (Joan H. Hollinger ed., 1990) (citing 1916

N.Y. Laws 453 § 113, which specifically prohibited issues concerning the "fact of
illegitimacy" from appearing in the transcripts of adoptive judicial proceedings, and
1917 Minn. Laws 222, § 7159, which provided for confidentiality and a complete bar
against public scrutiny of adoption proceedings).
127. See Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Adoption Practice Issues and Laws, 1958-83, 17
FAM. L.Q. 173, 190-91 (1983).
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concerning birth records, health histories, and biological origins, and
mandated the sealing of records and the issuance of new. "birth certificates" to adoptees. 128
Legislators based these adoption policies on a belief that
confidentiality protected the privacy rights of all parties to the adoption
process."2 9 Much of the support for these laws came from the efforts
of social workers, who believed that birth mothers desired anonymity
and a chance to start over after the stigma of an out-of-wedlock
birth. 30 Confidentiality shielded adoptive parents from unwanted intrusions into their redefined family unit. 31 Facilitating the child's
"new start," removing any lingering stigma of illegitimacy, and promoting "bonding" with a primary set of parents all guarded the
interests of the adopted child. 3 1 Creating a lawful family, providing
for orderly transfer and heritability, protecting parties from needless
intrusions and public scrutiny, and eliminating additional requirements
33
of record keeping and maintenance served the state's interests.
B. Criticism of Anonymity and Secrecy in the Adoption Process and
Legislative Responses
Despite these initial safeguards of confidentiality, a growing body of
research questioned the legitimacy of anonymity and secrecy in the
adoption process. 34 States began to allow adopted children and their
families access to relevant health and genetic information. Forty-one
128. As early as 1917, Minnesota created one of the first and most stringent of the
sealed records and secrecy laws. 1917 Minn. Laws 222. A complete severance is still
the norm in American adoption laws. See Hollinger, supra note 126, at 13-1 to 13-5.
129. See Blair, supra note 3, at 681, 687.
130. Rationales put forth for the "closed system" of adoption suggest that: (I) birth
mothers need protection and a chance to start over; (2) the child's integration into the
adoptive home will be undermined by the presence of a birth mother of unknown
location; (3) adoptive parents wish to be free from interference from birth parents; and
(4) interference could ultimately lead to a fight over custody. See SACHDEV, supra note
121; see also Carmelo Cocozelli, Predicting the Decision of Biological Mothers to
Retain or Relinquish Their Babies for Adoption: Implications for Open Placement, 68
CHILD WELFARE 33, 38 (1991) (opining that in light of the growing use of "open
placement" procedures, in which adoptive parents meet biological parents, it is
advantageous to accurately predict what variables impact a biological mother's decision
to actually relinquish her child after birth); Fady Hajal & Elinor B. Rosenberg, The
Family Life Cycle in Adoptive Families, 61 AM. J.ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 78, 83-85 (1991)
(analyzing the effects on the adoptive family of disclosing adoption).
1 3 I. Blair, supra note 3, at 695.
132. Janet H. Dickinson, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents: Substance or
Specter?, 38 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 917, 927 (1991) (discussing societal attitudes about the
adoption system).
133. Id. at 923-24.
134. See, e.g., Blair, supra note 3, at 698; Bebensee, supra note 2, at 398.
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states have enacted legislation either mandating or allowing the disclosure to adoptive families of an adopted child's health and genetic information.135 States passed these statutes largely in response to attacks
on the anonymity and secrecy of traditional adoption policy in the mid1980s, 136 when adoptive parents attempted to revoke adoptions after
discovering genetic, mental, or physical problems in their adopted children. 37 Within a few years, adoptive parents began to
successfully
38
sue adoption agencies for fraud and misrepresentation.
135. Those states that mandate disclosure include: ALA. CODE § 26-IOA-19(c)(6)
(1992); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-129, 130 (1989); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8608 (West
1996); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-207(2)(b) (1990); FLA. STAT. ch. 63.162(l)(f) (Supp.
1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 578-14.5 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 16-1506(3) (Supp. 1995);
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1-2(b) (West Supp. 1995); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.8(c) (West
Supp. 1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.520(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1995); MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-328 (1991 & Supp. 1995), §§ 5-329.1, 5-520 (1991); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 93-17-3 (Supp. 1991); Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.121(3) (Supp. 1996); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-8-122(3) (1995) (unless the adoptive parent is a stepparent or part of an
extended family); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-146.02 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1701:15 (1994 & Supp. 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41.1 (West Supp. 1995); N.Y. Soc.
SERV. LAW § 373-a (McKinney Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-25 (Supp. 1995);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.12 (Baldwin 1995); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.342
(1990); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2102 (1991 & Supp. 1995), § 2909 (1991); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-15.2 (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-140 (1995); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 78-30-16, 78-30-17 (1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 436 (1990 & Supp.
1995), § 461 (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-223 (Michie 1995); WYO. STAT. § 1-22116 (Supp. 1995).
Those states that predicate disclosure upon medical necessity include: DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 13, § 924 (Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-23(d) (1991); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 26.33.350, 26.33.380 (West Supp. 1996).
Other states mandate such information only when that information is available.
Nevertheless, the absence of such information does not preclude adoption. See ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-9-217 (Michie 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-746 (West Supp.
1995), § 45a-748 (West 1993); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750 § 50/18.4, (West 1996);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 5D (Law. Co-op. 1994); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.68
(West Supp. 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-16 (Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§
60.5A, 60.17 (West Supp. 1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1780 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1991) W. VA. CODE § 48-4-10 (1995); WIS. STAT. ANN § 48.93 (West 1987 & Supp.
1995) (mandatory if requested).
136. See generally Elizabeth N. Carroll, Abrogation of Adoption by Adoptive
Parents, 19 FAM. L. Q. 155, 160-173 (1985) (detailing the legislative response to
problems that had been caused by lack of information provided by adoption agencies
about adopted children).
137. See, e.g., Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soc'y, 437 N.W.2d 532, 540 (Wis. 1989)
(holding adoptive parents had a cause of action against agency for misrepresentation of
adoptive child's risk of Huntington's Disease); Jay M. Zittler, Annotation, Action for
Wrongful Adoption Based on Misrepresentation of Child's Mental or Physical
Condition or Parentage, 56 A.L.R. 4th 375, 379 (1987).
138. See Zittler, supra note 137, at 379-81. See also D. Marianne B. Blair, Getting
the Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth: The Limits of Liability for Wrongful
Adoption, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 850, 871-77 (1992) (examining the treatment of
intentional misrepresentation and nondisclosure by the courts); Robert A. Clifford &
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The statutes provide for varying degrees of collection and disclosure
of health and genetic information.'39 Some states loosely define the
types of information which must be obtained from birth parents and
released to adoptive parents,' 40 while others list with a high degree of
specificity the information that must be available. 14' While most states
require that certain information be released to the adoptive parents, two
states do not address this issue. 42 Despite these differences, states
clearly recognize the vast benefits derived
from making such infor43
mation available to adoptive families.
Amidst the conflicting interests inherent in every adoption, the
interests of the adopted child must be preeminent. Although policies
144
of confidentiality and secrecy have served a legitimate purpose,
scientific advances in the fields of genetic counseling, prenatology,
and neonatology can provide parties to an adoption with important information.'45 If appropriately utilized, this information can enhance
the lives of adopted children and all who interact with them. Thus,
legislation mandating the collection and dissemination of an adopted
child's health and genetic history can prove invaluable in helping the
child live a healthy and productive life.
IV. DEFINING RIGHTS

The child's happiness, too, is willed by the Deity; the child, too,
has faculties to be exercised; the child, too, needs scope for the
exercise of those faculties; the child therefore has claims to
freedom-rights as we call them--coextensive with those of the
adult. We cannot avoid this conclusion, if we would. Either we
must reject the law146altogether, or we must include under it both
sexes and all ages.

Pamela S. Menaker, Wrongful Adoption Gains Acceptance, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 28, 1992,
at 38 (discussing how wrongful adoption has been recognized as a new tort in courts);
John R. Maley, Wrongful Adoption as Superior Remedy to Annulment for Adoptive
Parents Victimized by Adoption Fraud, 20 IND. L. REV. 709, 712-14 (1987) (discussing
fraud between adoptive parents and a public or private agency regarding the health of the
adoptee).
139. For a discussion of the various statutes, see Bebensee, supra note 2, at 397. See
also Blair, supra note 3, at 681 (discussing non-disclosure policies and the current status
of state law).
140. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2102 (1991 & Supp. 1995).
141. See, e.g. OR. REV. STAT. ANN § 109.342(2) (1990).
142. See KAN. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59-2130 (Vernon 1994); MINN. STAT. § 259.79
(1992).
143. See supra notes 134-42 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
145. See supra part 11.
146. HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS 172 (Kelley ed., 1969).
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Having noted the usefulness of health and genetic information for
parties in adoption, the question remains whether access to that information rises to the level of a right. This Part determines whether the
status of a "right," as defined by philosophers Wesley Hohfeld and
Laurence Becker, should be placed upon accessing genetic information
in adoption settings.
A. "Rights" and Children
"Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically
only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as
well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights."'' 47 Giving "rights holders" status to minors may provide an additional hurdle for children in the adoption process because
of the peculiar nature of children's rights. Philosopher Laurence
Houlgate has noted that any discussion of children's rights must confront a "confusing and often incoherent set of intuitions."' 4 8 Houlgate
stated that "the problem of constructing a theory of juvenile rights
properly belongs to social philosophy. There is no agreed-upon definition of this rather amorphous area of inquiry .... It deals with a
set of philosophical questions about social problarge miscellaneous
149
lems."'
Legal rights have been granted to children in a fragmentary and
inconsistent way. 150 The dismaying lack of legal scholarship attempting to formulate a theory of rights, upon which decisions concerning
children's rights can be based, typifies one difficulty of the present
discussion. Existing theories fail as either overly simplistic descriptions of the present status of children's rights or polemical attacks on
the status of children coupled with proposals for radical legal reform. 15' The result often leaves legislatures and courts with incoherent
and inconsistent ideas and policies about children. Thus, a thesis that
adopted children have a right to state-provided health and genetic infor147. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
148. LAURENCE D. HOULGATE, THE CHILD & THE STATE-A NORMATIVE THEORY OF
JUVENILE RIGHTS xii (1980). Houlgate, a philosopher at California's Polytechnical
University, posits a "normative" theory: "a justifiable (set of) normative principle(s)
that can be used to guide decision and judgment making about legal rights." Id. at 4.
149. Id. at 4.
150. See infra part V.A.
15 1. See, e.g., Katherine H. Federle, On the Road to Reconceiving Rights for
Children: A Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 983,
1022 (1993) (noting that "if [legal scholars] are to acknowledge a valid theory of
children's rights, one that accounts for power and status, then our rights talk must
change dramatically").
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mation should be supported by a discussion of the nature, concept,
and definition of rights.
In the late seventeenth century, political philosopher Benedict de
Spinoza suggested that an individual's natural rights derive from the
power he can exert over others.' 52 Under de Spinoza's theory, the
rights of the sovereign derive from the combined power of the individuals who support him or her, and an individual's rights derive from
the sovereign's decision to uphold the law. 5 3 In the eighteenth
century, Jeremy Bentham defined rights in terms of corresponding
duties, and stressed the importance of sanctions when such duties are
breached.' 54 Bentham observed that "[w]ithout the notion of punishment.. ., no notion can we have of either right or duty."' 55 Bentham
argued that rights are interrelated with duties in support of the notion
that duty and obligation form the underpinnings of social responsibility. 5 6 In 1753, Blackstone stated:
The rights of persons considered in their natural capacities are
also of two sorts, absolute, and relative. Absolute, which are
such as appertain and belong to particular men, merely as
individuals or single persons[;] relative, which are incident to
of society, and standing in various relations to
them as members
57
each other.
In the twentieth century, notions of the nature of rights have dramatically expanded. These notions of rights as powers or as predictors of
the power that others will wield have given way to more modern
philosophical views.' 58 Legal realists have maintained that statements
which purport to describe rights are merely predictions of what a court
will do, or of what one can expect a court to do. 5 9 Today, rights have
152.
that "a
he can
153.

A.G. WERNHAM, BENEDICT DE SPINOZA: THE POLITICAL WORKS 270 (1958) (noting
man in the state of nature is possessed of his own right, or free, only as long as
protect himself from being subjugated by others").
Id. at 277, 279.

154. JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES, reprinted in COLLECTED

WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 88 (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart, eds. 1977).
155. JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT, reprintedin COLLECTED WORKS
OF JEREMY BENTHAM 495 (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart, eds. 1977). See also 4 ROSCOE
POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 74 (1959) ("Thus a right is what we should call a power which
one toward whom there is a duty may exercise in case of a breach ....").
156. See COLIN A. WRINGE, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS-A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 82 (1981).
157.

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 119 (1897)

(emphasis added).
158. See Catherine W. Hantzis, Legal Innovation Within the Wider Intellectual
Tradition: The Pragmatism of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 541, 566
(1988).
159. See, e.g., POUND, supra note 155, at 41-90 (including useful summaries of some
of the main juristic theories of rights, footnotes, and an extensive bibliography).
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a much broader definition. Rights qualify as "in personam" if they
impose an obligation on a single person, or "in rem" if they impose an
obligation on all persons. 60 Further classifications on rights split
them into primary, those that exist without reliance upon other rights,
and secondary, those that modify or are designed to protect or enforce
primary rights. 6 ' Four categories of constitutional rights exist: (1)
natural rights, which grow out of the nature of man; (2) civil rights,
which belong to every citizen; (3) political rights, which address participation in government; and (4) personal rights, which include "personal security, comprising those of life, limb, body, health, reputation
and the right of personal liberty."' 62
B.

Wesley Hohfeld's System of Rights

In 1919, Wesley Hohfeld described a system of rights in terms of
expectations and relationships.' 63 Hohfeld's system places the concepts of inter-relationship and duty into pairs of opposites. Hohfeld's
dynamic divides people into two non-exclusive categories: "rightholders" and "right-regarders."' Hohfeld considered right-holders in
relation with right-regarders, who have a duty that corresponds to the
right-holder's right. Similarly, Hohfeld considered privilege holders
in relation to those privilege regarders that have a corresponding lack
of right with respect to that privilege. 65 Hohfeld described these
relationships as jural correlates:
right
duty

privilege
no-right

power
liabili

immunity
disability

In this system, each concept is the jural correlate of the concept directly
66 Placing Hohfeld's scheme of jural correlates into
above or below it.
grammatical syntax, the following inter-relationships arise:
Right/Duty = "I claim and you must;"
160. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1324 (6th ed. 1990).
161. id. Secondary rights can be preventive or protective with respect to whether
they prevent or protect against the infringement of primary rights. Id.
162. Id. at 1324-25.
163. WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 35-64 (1923).
164. Id. at 35-64. "Regarders" is not Hohfeld's term, but is used here to refer to those
actors upon whom a claim of a right will have an impact. For example, with respect to a
fight, Hohfeld's system would ask: "Right of whom, that who do what?" The "who" that
must do something is the right-regarder. Id.
165. A right signifies one's affirmative claim against another. Id. at 7. A privilege
signifies one's freedom from the right or claim of another. Id.
166. Id. at 37-64.
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Privilege/No-Right = "I may and you cannot;"
Power/Liability = "I can and you must accept it;"
Immunity/Disability = "I can with167impunity and you
cannot."'

Hohfeld
called these four correlates the common denominators of the
68
law. 1

C. Lawrence Becker and Laurence Houlgate 's Use of Hohfeld's
System of Rights

Philosopher Lawrence Becker has described an analysis, consisting
of ten elements, to be used with Hohfeld's system when determining
whether a right exists. 169 The first five of Becker's elements have
central importance in the present discussion. They consist of 1) specification of the right-holders; 2) specification of the right-regarders
(those who must observe, respect, or honor the right); 3) specification
of the general nature of the Hohfeldian relation (such as right/duty,
privilege/no-right, power/liability, and immunity/disability) between
right-holders and right-regarders; 4) specification of the act, forbearance, status, or benefit owed to or possessed by the right-holder; and
5) specification of the conditions under which a claim-right may be
said to be sound, or general justification of those conditions. 170 In
Becker's analysis:
[A claim-right posits the] existence of a state of affairs such that
one individual or institution (the right-holder) has a claim on
another (the duty-bearer) for an act or forbearance in the sense
that, should the claim be in force or exercised, and the act or
forbearance not done, it would be moral (or legal) .. .to use
coercive measures to extract either the specific performance...
167. For example, these relationships might be such that in Right/Duty, one has a
claim to the payment of a debt, and the other has a duty to pay it. Id. at 36-38. In
Privilege/No-Right, one has a privilege to speak, and the other has no such privilege.
Id. at 38-50. In Power/Liability, a drill sergeant may have power to give orders, and a
recruit has the liability of having to follow them. Id. at 50-60. And in Immunity/
Disability, one may exercise protected free speech, while the other, who feels defamed
by the speech, has no ability to sue. Id. at 60-63.
168. Id. at 63-64.
169.

LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS:

PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS

8-11

(1977). See HOULGATE, supra note 148, at 6-7.
170. BECKER, supra note 169, at 8-10. Becker's other elements, which are beyond
the scope of the present analysis, are: specification of the conditions under which a
right may be said to have been violated, specification of the conditions under which the
violation of a right is excusable, specification of the appropriate remedies when a right
has been justifiably overridden, or otherwise violated; specification of the methods to
be used in extracting the remedies; and specification of the agent(s) who may extract the
remedies. Id. at 10-1I1.
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171
or compensation in lieu of it.

By using Hohfeld's system and Becker's analysis of the ten
elements of a claim-right, Houlgate has described a number of examples of children's "claim-rights. ' '
Claim-rights can be further
separated into "positive claim-rights," or duties to act, and "negative
claim-rights," or duties to forbear. 173 A positive claim-right is the right
of an individual to another's action (such as medical treatment) that is
necessary for the protection of the individual's life and limb. 74 Positive claim-rights impose duties on others to provide these necessities. 7 5 A negative claim-right is the right of an individual to be free
from the actions of another, and imposes a duty on others not to perform certain acts. 76 This Article argues that proper health and genetic
information is a positive claim-right of adopted children and their families, and that the state has a corresponding duty to provide such information.
Both Becker and Houlgate draw a further distinction, labeled a
"capacity claim": 177

One may wish, in asserting one's rights, to call particular
attention to one's status as a potential holder of rights. That is,
one may wish merely to assert, with a statement such as 'I have a
right to get married', that one is of age and mentally
78
competent-that one has the legal capacity to get married.'
Id. at 11.
172. HOULGATE, supra note 148, at 6. Houlgate states that:
the right that a child has to be provided with a proper home, subsistence,
education, medical care, and a proper moral climate is a claim right in the
sense defined. The duty bearer may be either the parents or other legally
171.

responsible custodians or the state itself . .

.

.

[lf a child is not being

provided with the aforementioned items, and he chooses to exercise his right,
then the court may . . . either order the parents (or other custodians) to

improve the child's situation while the child remains at home or, in extreme
cases, take the child out of the home into institutional care or a foster home..
. [l]t is the state that becomes the ultimate duty bearer.
Id. What Houlgate is describing in his phrase "and he chooses to exercise his right"
from the Hohfeldian perspective is not a right at all, but a "power" of the child to create
in a judge the "power" to create in the child a "privilege" to enforce a "duty" of the caregiver to provide the mandated support or care. Id.
173. Id. at 6-7.
174. Id. at 6.
175. See id. at 6-7.
176. Id. at 7. The right to live free from physical and sexual abuse can be seen as a
negative claim right, as can a right to privacy.
177. Capacity claim rights are discussed in depth in BECKER, supra note 169, at I I13 and HOULGATE, supra note 148, at 7.
178. HOULGATE, supra note 148, at 7 (quoting BECKER, supra note 169, at 12).

Houlgate suggests that "capacity claim rights" may cause confusion, because the
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Advocates of children's rights implicitly assert that children should
have the status or standing to be holders of rights. 79 While scholars
have made noble attempts at fairness in accounting for the rights of
children, many confusing and unexamined terms remain hidden within
the work of legal scholars concerning the rationale for children's
rights. 80° Therefore, this analysis will use a system based upon Hohfeld's correlates and Becker's analysis of the elements of Hohfeldian
rights to assert the existence of adopted children's rights to health and
genetic information. Becker's and Hohfeld's definitions of rights are
well suited to justify the collection of health and genetic information
relevant capacity is usually presupposed. Id. at 7. For example, a person asserting that
she has the right to marry also impliedly asserts that she is of sufficient age and mental
capacity to marry.
179. Becker states:
Right-claim locutions come naturally here, they amount to the assertion that
others 'owe' one the recognition that one has the capacity-the relevant
qualifications or standing as defined by the right making institutions or
considerations-to possess one or more sorts of rights.
BECKER, supra note 169, at 12. Houlgate concludes that "[iun the case of children, the
relevant right-claim locution often heard in their behalf is ... that they should have the
standing to possess many of the sorts of rights possessed by adults." Houlgate, supra
note 148, at 7.
180. Several authors have attempted to clarify these confusing issues. Margaret
Steinfels has classified children's rights into three major categories: the first views
parents' desires and authority as dominating, with the child having no interests apart
from her parents' interests; the second holds that parents have duties of care to their
children with an ultimate goal of raising the child to fulfill some religiously, socially,
or professionally agreed upon ideal state that does not necessarily represent the direct
self-interests of either the parent or the child; and the third states that the child has
individual interests and needs apart from those of the parents or others seeking to define
what is proper for the child. Margaret 0. Steinfels, Children's Rights, Parental Rights,
Family Privacy and Family Autonomy, in WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CHILD-THE PROBLEMS OF
PROXY CONSENT 223, 226 (Willard Gaylin & Ruth Macklin eds., 1988). Professor
Michael Wald divides children's rights into four general categories: generalized claims
children have against the world, or duties of everyone to a child; a child's rights to
adequate care and protection from harm, which implicates the state's parens patriae
responsibilities; the child's rights to fuller legal status, or the right claims of children
to due process and adult legal status; and the rights of children against their parents and
care-givers, or the right of each child to act independently of their parents. Michael
Wald, Children's Rights: A Framework for Analysis, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN THE
PRACTICE OF FAMILY LAW 3, 3-27 (Barbara Landau ed., 1986). See also LAURA M. PURDY,
IN THEIR BEST INTEREST? THE CASE AGAINST EQUAL RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN 16-17, 211-233
(1990) (observing that children's rights to a proper home, subsistence, education,
medical care, and moral environment comes at the price of being named, told where the
education will occur, where to live, and what to eat); PHILIP VEERMAN, THE RIGHTS OF THE
CHILD AND THE CHANGING IMAGE OF CHILDHOOD (1992) (citing Hohfeld for his valuable
definition of rights); Gerald P. Koocher, Different Lenses: Psycho-Legal Perspectives oil
Children's Rights, 16 NOVA L. REV. 711, 717 (1992) (discussing the ability of the child
in her decision-making and the unwillingness of courts to intervene on family conflicts
unless absolutely necessary).
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for adopted children. The first five of Becker's elements used in determining whether a right exists advance the present analysis. 8 '
Identification of the right-holders constitutes Becker's first element. 82 This Article describes adopted children and their adoptive
parents as these rights-holders. The state, in its social welfare, adoption, and public health institutions, fulfills Becker's second element,
identification of the right-regarder 83 Part V below discusses the third
element, the nature of the relationship between right-holders and rightregarders. 84 The fact that health and genetic information are often
vital to the care and upbringing of a child 85 satisfies Becker's fourth
element, specifying the act, forbearance, or benefit owed.,86 Similarly, the fact that the state's adoptive agents 'owe' its adoptees and
their families a duty to collect, store, and make this vital information
available satisfies Becker's fifth element, specifying 87the conditions
under which the claim-right may be considered sound.
V. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS

The third element 88 Becker used to analyze the validity of a claimright is specifying the nature of the relationship between the rightholders (adoptive children and their adoptive parents) and the rightregarders (the state). To address fully the nature of the relationship
between adoptive children, adoptive parents, and the state, this Part
discusses the historical status of parents, families, children, and the
state.
A. Children and the Law
Many early cases addressing the rights of children and families
failed to recognize such rights because of the federal courts' reluctance
to enter the field of domestic relations. 89 Further, many courts
i 81. See supra note 170 and accompanying text..
182. BECKER, supra note 170, at 8.
183. Id. at 9.
184. See infra part V.E.
185. See supra part I.
186. BECKER, supra note 169 at 9.
187. Id. at 9-10.
188. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1858) ("We disclaim
altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the subject of divorce.
. . ."). In 1890, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected a constitutional basis for
children's rights. Ex Parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 592 (1890). In Burrus, a father
obtained custody of his child from his former in-laws. Id. at 588. After the child's
grandfather retook her by force, he was imprisoned for contempt, and petitioned the
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refused to recognize children's rights, and instead adopted the view
held by English courts that parents' rights to their children are absolute, and similar to those of property owners' rights to their chattels. I9°
One commentator has described a contractual basis for this theory,
under which parents' obligations to care for and educate their children
entitles the parents to custody of their children.' 9' As late as the
1890s, American courts described parents' entitlement to the custody
and labor of their children as a trust relationship, wherein the parents
served the state's interests in promoting the child's welfare. 192
Federal courts did not begin to give constitutional recognition to
family rights until the 1920s.' 19 In Meyers v. Nebraska,194 the SuSupreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 588-94. In ordering the grandfather's
release, the Supreme Court held that the district court lacked the jurisdiction to make out
its writ:
The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and
child, belongs to the laws of the states and not to the laws of the United
States. As to the right to the control and possession of this child, as it is
contested by its father and its grandfather, it is one in regard to which neither
the Congress of the United States, nor any authority of the United States, has
any special jurisdiction.
Id. at 593-94.
190. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967) (discussing children's status in the
formative years of the United States courts).
191. See, e.g., 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 205 (1884); see also
Monaghan v. School Dist. No. 1, 38 Wis. 100, 105 (1875) ("By law, the father is under
obligation to support his infant child, and he is entitled to receive the child's
earnings.").
192. See, e.g., Whalen v. Olmstead, 23 A. 964, 965 (Conn. 1891) (stating that the
child's interest and welfare are paramount to the parent's control and custody); Chapsky
v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650, 652-53 (1881) (emphasizing that a child is not a piece of
property); State v. Richardson, 40 N.H. 272, 273 (1860) (claiming that the relationship
of the father and minor child is like a trust that can be displaced for inability or
unfaithfulness).
193. The federal courts exercised jurisdiction over a number of domestic matters when
one of the parties asserted a constitutional right. For example, in Simms v. Simms, 175
U.S. 162, 168 (1899), the Supreme Court recognized the power of Congress to legislate
for the territories and considered an appeal of a divorce granted in a territory. In McNeil
v. McNeil, 78 F. 834 (N.D. Cal. 1897), the federal court exercised jurisdiction over a
divorce obtained through fraud. Id. at 839. The reasoning behind the jurisdictional
holding grew out of the fraud issue. Id. at 834-35. The court held that because fraud fell
within the equitable chancery jurisdiction of the English courts when the United States
was formed, the court had jurisdiction over the fraud claim. Id. at 835.
In contrast, the traditional view that the jurisdiction of the federal courts did not
include domestic relations issues lingered. For example, in Ohio ex. rel. Popovici v.
Alger, 280 U.S. 379 (1930), Justice Holmes offered in dictum: "[It has been] unquestioned for three quarters of a century that the Courts of the United States have no jurisdiction over divorce.... [Tihe domestic relations of husband and wife and parent and child
were matters reserved to the States .... " Id. at 383, 384.
194. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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preme Court recognized the fundamental right of parents and families
to educate and rear their children. 91 5 The concept of children as chattels or wards of the state began to lose support in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 96 where the Court held that a "child is not the mere creature of
the state."' 197 -Subsequently, in Prince v. Massachusetts, 98 the Court
noted that the "custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents."' 9 9 Greater recognition of family rights continued with
Ginsberg v. New York,2° in which the Court reiterated that parents
have a constitutionally protected right to direct the upbringing of their
children,20 ' and insisted that parents are entitled to the support of laws
designed to reinforce their authority. 2°2
In 1972, the Supreme Court decided two cases that further recognized parental rights. 20 3 In Stanley v. Illinois,2 °4 the Court held that a
state cannot deprive a father of the care and custody of his child-based
on a presumption that the father's unwed status made him an unfit
parent. 2°5 The Court acknowledged that the integrity of the family unit
is accorded constitutional protection, and described theright to raise

195. Id. at 399. Meyers involved the rights of a Nebraska teacher convicted for
teaching a foreign language in the schools. Id. at 396-97. The Court squarely addressed
the issues of state intervention into family life and parents' right to plan for their
children's education. Id. at 400.
196. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
197. Id. at 535. Pierce involved Oregon statutes that mandated attendance at public
school. Id. at 530-31. The appellees argued that the statute interfered with "the right of
parents to choose schools where their children will receive appropriate mental and
religious training." Id. at 532.
198. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
199. Id. at 166. In Prince, the Court upheld the conviction of an aunt and custodian
of children for encouraging the children to sell a religious magazine on the streets. Id. at
159-60. While noting that parents and guardians must be preeminent in making
decisions that concern their children, the Court nevertheless affirmed the conviction by
recognizing the significant state interests involved in controlling child labor. Id. at
166.
200. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
201. Id. at 639.
202. Id. This growing recognition of constitutionally protected parental rights led
one state court to describe the rights of parents to their children as "more precious to
many people than their right to life itself." In re Gibson, 483 P.2d 131, 135 (Wash.
1971).
203. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972). See infra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
204. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
205. Id. at 649. In Stanley, a father and mother of three children lived together for
various periods over an 18 year period. Id. at 646. After the mother's death, the State
asserted that the fact that the father was not married to the mother created an irrebuttable
presumption of unfitness. Id.
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one's child as essential.) 6 In addition, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,20 7 the
Court weighed the interests of the State against the interests of parents
when determining that a compulsory education statute was unconstitutional.208
Recognition of family rights continued in Parham v. J.R.2 °9 In
Parham,the Court supported a presumption that parents act in their
children's best interests. 21° The Court held that a child has a substantial and protectible interest in freedom from unnecessary bodily
restraint, and that parents have the same interest in their child's
freedom and well being.2t Parents, the Court noted, "possess what a
child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required
for making life's difficult decisions. '21 2 Additionally, in H.L. v.
206. Id. at 651. The Court further held that states may not declare presumptions
against parental interests where no opportunity to rebut them is offered. Id. at 657. See
also Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 (1979) (holding that the state could not
apply a presumption of parental unfitness merely because of a child's illegitimacy).
207. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
208. Id. at 214. In Yoder, Amish parents challenged a Wisconsin statute requiring
them to send their children to a public high school on the grounds that it violated both
their parental authority and their freedom of religion. Id. at 209.
209. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
2 10. Id. at 602. Parhainwas a procedural due process case involving a Georgia statute
that allowed parents to commit their children to state mental hospitals against the
child's wishes. Id. at 588.
211. Id. at 602.
212. Id. at 602. This same reasoning later guided the Court in Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622 (1979), where the Court again noted its deference to parental decision-making:
"[D]uring the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the
experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be
detrimental to them." Id. at 635. In Bellotti, the Court struck down a Massachusetts
abortion notification and consent statute for women under the age of 18 because it did
not provide a judicial process by which "mature minors" could decide for themselves to
have an abortion. Id. at 643.
In two subsequent cases, the Court reached different results over whether challenged
statutes met the alternative procedure described in Bellotti. See, e.g., City of Akron v.
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) overruled by Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). The Court in City of Akron dealt with a provision of an
ordinance prohibiting a physician from performing an abortion on a pregnant girl under
age 15 unless the physician obtained the informed written consent of one of her parents
or her legal guardian, or unless the minor obtained an order from a court having
jurisdiction over her that the abortion be performed. Id. at 422 n.4. The Court held that
the ordinance was unconstitutional because it made a blanket determination that all
minors under the age of 15 are too immature to make an abortion decision or that an
abortion without parental consent never may be in the minor's best interests. Id. at
440. City of Akron was overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881
(1992), where the Court found that provisions of a Pennsylvania abortion statute
requiring parental consent or consent from the juvenile court for minors seeking an
abortion did not place an undue burden on the girl's constitutional right to seek an
abortion. Id. at 898-99. See also Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476,
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Matheson,2 3 the Court concluded that "constitutional interpretation has
consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own
household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure
of our society."2 4' In Hodgson v. Minnesota,t 5 the Court addressed
a Minnesota statute that required dual parental notification and a fortyeight-hour waiting period for a minor to obtain an abortion. 1 6 The
Court held that, while the dual parental notification requirement alone
was unconstitutional, a judicial bypass provision "saved" the statute. 211 In his concurrence as to one part of the opinion, Justice
Stevens discussed the competing interests of the parents and the State
in protecting the minor.2 18 He noted that:
Parents have an interest in controlling the education and
upbringing of their children . .

.

.

[T]he demonstration of

commitment to the child through the assumption of personal,
financial, or custodial responsibility may give the natural parent
a stake in the relationship with the child rising to the level of a
liberty interest.21 9
The states, however, have "a strong and legitimate interest in the welfare of [their] young citizens, whose immaturity, inexperience, and
493 (1983) (holding that a Missouri statute, which required minors to secure parental
consent or consent from the juvenile court for an abortion, was constitutional, where the
juvenile court could not deny the minor's application for consent to an abortion "for
good cause" unless the court first found that the minor was not mature enough to make
her own decision).
213. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
214. Id. at 410. In Matheson, a minor alleged that the parental notification
provision in a Utah abortion statute violated her rights to privacy. id. at 400. The
Court found that requiring parental notification furthered the legitimate interests of the
State by fostering parent/child communication. Id. at 411.
215. 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
216. Id. at 422. The plaintiffs, two physicians, four clinics, a parent, and six
pregnant minors opposed portions of Minnesota statute prohibiting an abortion on a
woman under the age of 18 until at least 48 hours after both of her parents had been
notified. Id. at 429. The district court concluded that the two parent notification and the
48 hour waiting period provisions were invalid. Id. at 430. The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed this decision. Id. Several years later, the Eighth Circuit reheard the
case en banc, and unanimously rejected the State's argument that the two parent
notification requirement was valid without the judicial bypass procedure. Id. at 431.
However, a majority held that the judicial bypass procedure protected minors from an
undue and unconstitutional burden of two parent notification and therefore upheld the
statute. Hodgsen v. Minnesota, 853 F.2d 1452, 1465 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
217. Hodgsen, 497 U.S. at 455. The Court found the 48 hour waiting period
constitutional. Id.
218. Id. at 444-45 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens wrote the opinion of
the Court with regard to certain parts, but wrote a separate concurring and a dissenting
opinion for two other parts.
219. Id. at 445-46 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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lack of judgment may sometimes impair their ability to exercise their
rights wisely. 220
The Court's recognition of "family life" as essential to our society
complements its pronouncements concerning parents' rights. One
commentator has stated that in this century, America is witnessing the
"constitutionalization of family law."22 ' In the last twenty years, the
Court has addressed emotional attachment in families, 222 procedural
mechanisms for assuring child support upon remarriage,22 the rights
of unwed fathers to maintain relationships with their children 22 4 family autonomy and parental authority, 2 5 and the burdens of proof
required to break up a natural family.2 26 However, the inconsistency
with which the Court addressed family law cases has confused commentators. 7 Thus, while children's rights are protected by the Constitution, the extent of this protection is unclear, as are the permissible
actions a state may take to protect the health and safety of children.

220. Id. at 444 (Stevens, J.,concurring).
221. Homer H. Clark, The Supreme Court Faces the Family, 5 FAM. ADvoc. 20, 22
(1982). Clark attempts to portray the state regulation of the family as severely limited
by "the injection of constitutional doctrine into so many family law cases." Id. at 24.
His essay describes how the Supreme Court's application of due process and equal
protection analysis has transformed family law. Id. at 21.
222. See, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431
U.S. 816, 842 (1977) (acknowledging that a legitimate family relationship exists
between foster parents and their foster children).
223. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 389 (1978) (noting that wage assignments,
civil contempt proceedings, and criminal penalties already existed to procure child
support payments).
224. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (holding that a father's right
to bar the adoption of an illegitimate child must be the same as the mother's right)..
225. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637 (1979) (limiting the decision-making
authority of parents when a minor child seeks an abortion).
226. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768 (1982) (holding that a 'fair
preponderance of the evidence' standard used in a parental rights termination proceeding
violated the Due Process Clause).
227. See SAMUEL M. DAVIS & MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND THE
LAW 86-98 (1987); Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional
Charter for an Expanded Law of Privacy?, 64 MICH. L. REV. 197, 199-203 (1965-1966);
John Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920,
942-46 (1973); Thomas 1. Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L.
REV. 219, 225-31 (1965-1966); Richard A. Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any
Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SuP. CT. REV. 159, 159-68 (1973); Thomas C.
Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN L. REV. 703, 718-21 (1975);
Francis B. McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status and Meaning of Parental
Rights, 22 GEORGIA L. REV. 975, 975-998 (1988).
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B. A History of Children'sRights in America
The modem notion that children have rights has strong intuitive,228
legislative, 229 and judicial grounding, 23° but this has not always been
true. For example, in 1874, a social worker (without another remedy)
convinced an attorney for the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals to prosecute a child abuse case under laws preventing cruelty
to animals, as no laws against child abuse existed. 23 The publicity
surrounding the case stimulated child abuse and neglect legislation
throughout the United States. 2
Courts in most early American cases involving children decided
these cases against the children. 3 Traditionally, neglect and delinquency statutes allowed juvenile and family courts to use informal and
discretionary procedures more characteristic of courts of equity than
those of law in dispositional decisions.234 Popular belief dictated that
such informality and discretion facilitated the state's objective of rehabilitating a wayward child.235
The state's police powers 236 have been described as "the least
' ' 237 and have been utilized to
limitable
of interventions
the exercises to
of promote
government,
justify
state
the "public
health, safety, morals,

228. Wendy A. Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 13-19 (1994).
229. See, e.g., Laureen D'Ambia & Thomas Finn, Lawyering for Children in Care of
the States, 42 R.I. B.J. 7, 18 (1994) (giving an example of legislative grounding with
Rhode Island's General Assembly encouraging "legislative advocacy 'to ensure the
legal, civil, and special rights of children"') (citation omitted).
230. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. i, 11-17 (1967).
231. HOULGATE, supra note 148, at xi.
232. Mason P. Thomas, Jr., Child Abuse and Neglect Part I: Historical Overview,
Legal Matrix and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REV. 293, 310 (1971-1972). To help
protect children and pressure legislatures, the New York Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Children was formed in 1874, followed by 161 similar groups formed over the
next 25 years. Id. at 312.
233. See infra notes 243-54 and accompanying text.
234. See HERBERT H. Lou, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1927), for a
discussion of the history of the juvenile court system in its formative years.
235. See Note, Misapplication of the Parens Patriae Power in Delinquency
Proceedings, 29 IND. L.J. 475, 477-89 (1953-1954) for an extensive review of cases
that protected juvenile court procedures against constitutional attack.
236. Powers not reserved by the Constitution for the federal government are left to
the states through the Tenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. X. Included in these
powers is the states' power to regulate for public safety reasons, or "police power."
Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138, 144 (1908); Richard E. Levy, An Unwelcome
Stranger: Congressional Individual Rights Power and Federalism, 44 KAN. L. REV. 61,
70 (1995).
237. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 529, 548 (1917).
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or general welfare, 238 as well as to promote more abstract goals, such
as aesthetic 239 and family values. 2 40 States have consistently used
police powers to intervene in citizens' lives to prevent or punish acts
that threaten the security of the state or its interests.24' The exercise of
police powers has been most pronounced in the area of state intervention into the family.242
While the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to assert some aspect of the public welfare in order to
invoke its police power,243 state interventions in family relations have
been recognized as a legitimate exercise of such powers. The "public
custody" cases provide an example of the broad discretion states once
had when exercising their police powers.2 In many of these cases, a
state invoked its parens patriae powers 245 to further police power
objectives, when doing so could be unconstitutional, and even contrary to the child's best interests. 246
Parens patriae powers have their genesis in thirteenth century
England, when the King assumed the guardianship of lunatics.247 The
238. Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (upholding a
local zoning ordinance as a valid exercise of local authority).
239. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (upholding as constitutional a
redevelopment plan to beautify the District of Columbia).
240. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (upholding a zoning
ordinance to restrict areas to family neighborhoods).
24 1. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA ix (1974). Even advocates of a
"minimal state" agree that the state has a legitimate role in acting against those who
directly threaten its existence and/or the life of its citizens.
242. Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1156, 1221-27 (1980) [hereinafter Developments].
243. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 118 (1877).
244. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Howe, 51 Conn. 472, 475 (C.P. 1884); see also
Developments, supra note 242, at 1224 (citing various cases showing the nearly
unchecked powers that states once had when acting on a child's behalf).
245. Developments, supra note 242, at 1226. The parens patriae doctrine enables
the state to act as a "father," intervening in family relationships to protect children. Id.
at 1221-22. See also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 152, 158, 166 (1944)
(explaining that a state can invoke its parens patriae power to protect the welfare of
minors); Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae,27 EMORY
L.J. 195, 196-97 (1978) (tracing the parens patriaetheory back to the English Crown of
the thirteenth century).
246. See infra note 251 and accompanying text.
247. See, e.g., Gilbert T. Venable, Note, The Parens PatriaeTheory and its Effect on
the Constitutional Limits of Juvenile Court Powers, 27 U. PITT. L. REV. 894, 894-913
(1966). The King assumed guardianship after the lords responsible for the wardship of
incompetent heirs committed a number of abuses that operated to disinherit the
incompetents. Id. at 895.
The first reported judicial use of parens patriae power to protect children was Eyre v.
Shaftsbury, 24 Eng. Rep. 659 (Ch. 1722), in which the court analogized its power to
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courts of the early United States subsequently greatly expanded the
state's parens patriae power.2 48 To rationalize the exercise of such
powers, courts noted that a parent's custody of a child is based only
upon the extent to which the custody furthers the state's interest in the
child's welfare.2 49 Expanding parenspatriae powers met little constitutional challenge in the nineteenth century. ° By the late 1800s,
however, the intervention of the state into the family had become problematic, as procedural safeguards were virtually nonexistent.25 '
protect children in need to the King's power to protect lunatics. In Wellesley v.
Wellesley, 4 Eng. Rep. 1078 (H.L. 1828), the court held that the only rights parents
possess over their children are those that derive from the state.
248. See, e.g., Rebecca Owing's Case, I Bland's Ch. 290, 294 (Md. 1827); In re
Mason, I Barb. ch. 436, 443 (N.Y. App. Div. 1847); The Parsee Merchant's Case, 11
Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 209, 219-22 (N.Y.C.P. 1871). In Ex Parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9 (Pa.
1839), an American court for the first time upheld the removal of a child from a natural
parent under parens patriae authority. Noting that there is "no natural right to
exemption from restraints which conduce to an infant's welfare," the court denied a
father's habeas corpus petition that sought the return of his daughter from the reform
school to which she had been committed. Id. at 11.
249. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 26 F. Cas. 30, 31 (C.C.R.I. 1824) (No.
15,256). In Green, Justice Story offered: "As to the question of the right of a father to
have the custody of his infant child, in a general sense it is true. But this is not on
account of any absolute right of the father, but for the benefit of the infant .
I..."
ld. See
also State v. Richardson, 40 N.H. 272, 273 (1860) (holding that a father's right of
custody is "regarded as a trust ... upon the presumption that the natural affection of the
parent will ensure its faithful execution").
250. See, e.g., State v. Bailey, 157 Ind. 324, 329 (1901), in which the court upheld a
statute permitting the State to intervene into any area of child rearing without any
demonstration of parental inadequacy. See also State ex rel Sharpe v. Banks, 25 Ind.
495, 499-500 (1865) (holding that the State may remove a child from an unfit father);
Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650, 662 (1881) (recognizing a child's interest must be
considered in a custody case); English v. English, 32 N.J. Eq. 738, 741-44 (1880)
(determining which parent takes custody of the children based on the well-being of the
children); Gishwiler v. Dodez, 4 Ohio St. 615, 624 (1855) (explaining that it is the
court's duty to protect the child's interest in a custody hearing).
251. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Howe, 51 Conn. 472 (C.P. 1884) (upholding a statute
allowing the commitment of children whenever they were in danger of "being brought up
to lead idle or vicious lives"); In re Ferrier, 103 I11.
367, 373-76 (1882) (upholding a
statute providing no due process to family members and allowing the State to remove
children from their families and place them in industrial schools); Farnham v. Pierce,
141 Mass. 203, 204 (1886) (upholding a statute authorizing the removal of a child from
its parents if the child was "growing up without education or salutary control, and in
circumstances exposing him to lead an idle and dissolute life"); Cincinnati House of
Refuge v. Ryan, 37 Ohio St. 197, 201-03 (1881) (denying a parent's challenge to an
Ohio statute allowing a child to be committed to a "house of refuge" without providing
the parents with notice or an opportunity to be heard); Milwaukee Indus. Sch. v.
Supervisors of Milwaukee County, 40 Wis. 328, 334 (1876) (upholding a statute
allowing state intervention into a family whenever a child "frequents the company of
reputed thieves, or of lewd, wanton, or lascivious persons in speech and behavior, or
notorious resorts of bad characters").
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As state intervention became more problematic, courts and commentators offered three rationales for the state's exercise of its parens
patriae power. The first asserted that children lack the capacity or
25 2
maturity to look after themselves, so the state must do it for them.
The second argued that the state must occasionally intervene in family
life when parents are unwilling or unfit to discharge their parental responsibility. 23 The third rationale stated that once it is determined that
children are in need of protection and that their parents are unwilling or
unable to provide adequately for them, the state will intervene in its
parenspatriaecapacity to further the "best interests" of the child.2
Nevertheless, a state's exercise of its parens patriaepowers is now
subject to constitutional limitations. By the 1960s, a growing number
of scholars and courts questioned the constitutionality of unchecked
parenspatriaepowers, regardless of what rationales its proponents asserted.255 In In re Gault,the Supreme Court announced that the parens

252. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444 (1990) (arguing that the
State holds a vital interest in the welfare of a pregnant minor); Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622, 623 (1979) (noting the "peculiar" vulnerability of children as a justification
for the parens patriae power of the state); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979)
(noting that because children lack the capacity to make "sound judgments," their parents
must assume the responsibility for decision-making); Casey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678, 705 (1977),(Powell, J., concurring) (observing that the state is justified
in its parens patriae intervention because children are "not possessed of capacity for
individual choice"); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 102, 104-05 (1976)
(Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (explaining that the state's interest in
protecting a minor from harm justifies state intrusion); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629, 650 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that children lack the "full" capacity
for individual choice, which is a presumption for First Amendment guarantees).
253. See, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63
(1977) (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart's opinion states that "[i]f a [sitate were
to attempt to force the break up of a natural family, over the objections of the parents
and their children, without some showing of unfitness, I should have little doubt that the
state would have intruded impermissibly on 'the private realm of family life which the
state cannot enter."' Id. (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
254. See, e.g., Michael Wald, State Interventions on Behalf of "Neglected" Children:
A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 987-89 (1975); Note, In the
Child's Best Interests: Right of the Natural Parents in Child Placement Proceedings, 51
N.Y.U. L. REV. 446, 456-61 (1976).
255. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13-21 (1967); FRANCIS ALLEN, THE
BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1964); MARGARET ROSENHEIM, JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD,
THE JUVENILE COURT INTRANSITION 96-101 (1962) (suggesting that the role of the court is
too broad and not clearly defined in juvenile cases); PAUL TAPPAN, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
(1949) (proposing limiting the power of courts in juvenile delinquency hearings); Ben
Lindsey, The Juvenile Court Movement from a Lawyer's Standpoint, 52 ANNALS 140,
148-51 (1914); Monrad Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV.
547, 562 (1957) (discussing procedures courts can take to protect children's rights).
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patriae doctrine is of "dubious relevance, ' 56 and insisted that state
courts must "candidly appraise" a state's assertion of parens patriae
powers when doing so denies children the procedural safeguards
guaranteed by the Constitution.1 7 The Gault Court weighed the
state's claim to benevolent paternalism through parenspatriae powers
against the due process claim of a juvenile enmeshed in the state's
criminal process. z8 The Court's analysis began with a powerful statement: "[w]hatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone." '59
In Goss v. Lopez,260 the Court addressed the procedural due process to which a child is entitled when under suspension from public
school. The Court reasoned that the state's guarantee to its citizens of
a free public education rose to the level of a property right that cannot
be taken without due process of law.26'
The following year, the Court reaffirmed that children's status as
"persons" with constitutional rights when it declared unconstitutional a
statute that required a pregnant woman under the age of eighteen to
obtain the consent of her parent(s) or guardian(s) in order to obtain an
abortion. 62 The Court declared that "[c]onstitutional rights do not
mature and come into being magically only when one attains the statedefined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by
the Constitution and possess constitutional rights., 263 While the Court
acknowledged that "the State has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults," it found that the state
256. Gault, 387 U.S. at 15.
257. Id. at 16.
258. Id. at 26.
259. Id. at 13. Two years later, in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), the Court announced that "First Amendment rights, applied
in the light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to
teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Id. at
506. In overturning a school policy which forbade students from wearing armbands to
protest the Vietnam War, the Court noted that "[s]tudents in school as well as out of
school are 'persons' under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights
which the State must respect. . . ." Id. at 511.
260. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
261. Id. at 574.
262. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72-75 (1976). In a complicated,
multi-part and badly fractured decision, five justices supported the Court's holding,
striking down the parental consent provision, although two questioned the Court's rationale. Id. at 52-54. Four justices dissented, writing that the provision was constitutional. Id. at 89-104 (White, J., Rehnquist, J., Burger, C.J., Stevens, J.,concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
263. Id. at 74.
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could not demonstrate a significant enough interest to abridge the
rights of its minor citizens.2 4
C. Disclosure of Health and Genetic Information in Furtheranceof
Children'sRights
Amidst the uncertainty of the constitutional limitations upon a state's
exercise of its parens patriae power,265 the balancing test used in
Matthews v. Eldridge266 provides a logical and firm foundation for the
rights proposed by this analysis. In Matthews, the Court articulated its
clearest attempt to establish guidelines for balancing the state's
interests against an individual's interests. The Court stated that three
factors must be balanced when determining whether procedural due
process protections have been met.267 These factors also influence a
determination of whether a right should be granted to an individual or
group, when doing so might infringe upon the rights of others. The
Matthews factors consist of 1) the private interests affected by granting
the right; 2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest; and 3) the
government's interest.268
The Matthews balancing test is one of the preeminent tools available
to scholars, jurists, and commentators to understand the interests to be
balanced among the state, the child, and the parents when the child's
rights are asserted. 269 The first Matthews factor is the private interests
264. Id. at 75. The Court found the parents' interest in the termination of their
child's pregnancy "no more weighty than the right of privacy of the competent minor
mature enough to have become pregnant." Id. at 75.
See also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), in which the Court
used similar reasoning when overturning a law prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to
minors. In a plurality decision, four justices wrote it was "unreasonable to assume that
the state has prescribed pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child (or the physical
and psychological dangers of an abortion) as punishment for fornication." Id. at 694-95
(plurality opinion) (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972)).
265. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
266. 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (upholding a procedural due process challenge to the
administrative procedure used by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare for
assessing whether a continuing disability exists).
267. Id. at 332-35.
268. Id. at 335.
269. See also Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 46 (1981)
(holding that the failure to appoint counsel for indigent parents in a parental
termination proceeding did not deprive parents of due process rights because no criminal
charges were specified or charged, the case was relatively trouble free, and the presence
of counsel would not have changed the outcome); Raymond C. O'Brien, An Analysis of
Realistic Due Process Rights of Children Versus Parents, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1209, 1209,
1211, 1247-56 (1994) (arguing that the Matthews test is frequently used in all
procedural due process questions at both the state and federal level).
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that are affected. In the adoption context the private interests that are
affected involve the health and welfare of the state's adoptive children
and the legitimate but conflicting privacy interests of the birth parents.
The second Matthews factor is the risk of erroneous deprivation of the
interest that will be affected. 7 ' Here, the risks of erroneously depriving such interests encompass quality of life considerations, with these
decisions having potentially grave consequences for the state's adopted
children,272 and a conflicting intrusion into the privacy of the children's birth parents. Finally, the third Matthews factor is the government's interest. 273 In tea
the adoption context, the government's interests
include both the children's health and welfare interests as well as the
parental privacy concerns described above. 4 When the state implements appropriate privacy protections, the needs of adopted children
for health and genetic information then outweighs the privacy interests
of their birth parents.
D. Police Power and Confidential Health Information
The Supreme Court has long acknowledged that, subject to constitutional limitations, a state may use its police power to legislate to
protect the health, welfare, and the safety of its citizens. In Jacobson v
275 the Court held that a state may use its police power
Massachusetts,
to mandate smallpox vaccinations. 6 The Court noted that the exercise
of personal liberty "does not import an absolute right in each person to
be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. ' ' 277 Because public health is a primary obligation of the
state,278 the Court rejected an argument that mandatory vaccination
constituted an impermissible assault upon personal freedoms.279

270. Matthews, 424 U.S. at 332-35.
271. Id.
272. See supra part 1.
273. Matthews, 424 U.S. at 332-35.
274. See, e.g., In re Adoption of J.S.P.L., 532 N.W.2d 653, 662 (N.D. 1995) (noting
that the government has an interest in the welfare of the child and "'shares the parent's
interest in an accurate and just decision"') (citations omitted); Juman v. Louise Wise
Servs., 608 N.Y.S.2d 612, 617-18 (1994) (requiring an adoptive family or adopted child
to show "good cause" to access information regarding biological parents, as public
policy dictates that the government keep this information confidential under most
circumstances).
275. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
276. Id. at 31-33.
277. Id. at 26.
278. Id. at 27-29.
279. Id.
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Similarly, many states have passed laws mandating venereal disease
screening,280 which their courts have upheld.'
By holding that the state may diminish the privacy rights of an individual on behalf of the health of another,282 the Supreme Court laid a
foundation upon which a justification for genetic and health information disclosure can be based. 3 Commentators have made numerous arguments to justify the assembly of genetic screening information.2 4 These include the need to collect information concerning the
incidence and prevalence of genetic diseases; 285 the need to protect the
citizenry from transmission of genetic diseases ;286 the savings achieved
by conserving resources through premorbid screening; 287 and the
ability of screening and information banks to protect future generations
from genetic disease.288 In light of the tremendous benefits to be
gained from the disclosure to adoptive families of the adopted child's
health and genetic history, 9 the compiling of such information is a
legitimate exercise of the state's police powers.
280. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-26 (West 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 193-40 (1991 & Supp. 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-20 (West 1968 & Supp. 1995).
28 1. See, e.g., Fisher v. Sweet & McLain, 35 A.2d 756, 760-765 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1944) (explaining valid reasons for premarital syphilis testing); In re Kilpatrick, 375
S.E.2d 794, 798-802 (W. Va. 1988) (upholding statute requiring premarital standard
serological test).
282. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See also Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (reaffirming Roe's holding that, subsequent to fetus
viability, a state may "regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is
necessary ... for the preservation of the life of health of the mother").
283. See, e.g., Sonia M. Suter, Note, Whose Genes Are These Anyway?: Familial
Conflicts over Access to Genetic Information, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1854 (1993). The
author provides a cogent analysis of the constitutional privacy issues involved with
genetic testing in a variety of situations. Id. at 1863. Inter and intra family conflicts
over the acquisition and use of genetic information is discussed in depth. Id. at 1864-69.
The author makes an argument from tort law as to the differences inherent in prohibiting
misfeasance versus prohibiting nonfeasance, and opines that it may be a fundamental
breach of personal liberty interests to force genetic screening when the diseases
screened for may not be curable. Id. at 1898-1900. She argues that "compulsory genetic
testing can be narrowly tailored to the compelling state interest." Id. at 1900.
284. Harold P. Green & Alexander M. Capron, Issues of Law and Public Policy in
Genetic Screening, in ETHICAL, SOCIAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF SCREENING FOR HUMAN
GENETIC DISEASE 165 (Daniel Bergsma ed., 1974); James R. Sorenson, Some Social and
Psychologic Issues in Genetic Screening: Public and Professional Adaption to
Biomedical Innovation, in ETHICAL, SOCIAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF SCREENING FOR
HUMAN GENETIC DISEASE 165 (Daniel Bergsma ed., 1974).
285. Green & Capron, supra note 284, at 173.
286. Id. at 173-74.
287. Id. at 178-81.
288. Id. at 175-78.
289. See supra part II.
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E. Becker's Third Element and the HistoricalStatus of Parents,
.Families, Children,and the State
Becker's and Hohfeld's definitions of rights 290 are well-suited to
justify the collection of health and genetic information for adopted children. The first five of Becker's elements used to determine whether a
right exists advance this analysis. 29' This Article has previously
established the first, second, fourth, and fifth elements.292
Above, this Part has established Becker's third element. This element, 293 used to analyze the validity of a claim-right, is a specification
of the general nature of the relationship between the right-holders
(adoptive children and their adoptive parents) and the right-regarders
(the state). This Part has discussed the general nature of the historical
relationship between and status of parents, families, children, and the
state.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has discussed children's rights from philosophical and
legal perspectives. An attempt has been made to ground a discussion
of children and rights in the work of noted philosophers and scholars.
This analysis concludes with a discussion of the first five of Becker's
analytical elements concerning rights 294 in the context of an adopted
child's need for health and genetic information.
In the present discussion, the adopted children are the right-holders,
while their adoptive parents are the children's agents. The state, by
and through its adoption and social welfare agencies, is the rightregarder. Employees of adoption and social welfare agencies are in the
best position to obtain gestation, health, and genetic information.
This Article has explored this relationship between the right-holders
and right-regarders. 9 5 The clear mandate from a string of recent
cases 296 clearly demonstrates the continued validity of the Court's
290. See supra part IV.
291. See supra text accompanying note 170.
292. See supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text (discussing and applying
Becker's elements one, two, four, and five).
293. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 169-289 and accompanying text.
295. See supra part V.
296. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 456 (1990) (holding that the dual
parental notification requirement for minors seeking an abortion was unconstitutional);
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 854 (1990) (holding that one-way closed circuit
television would be admissible under the confrontation clause when necessary to protect
a child witness' rights); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72-73 (1976)
(holding that a written parental consent requirement for minors seeking an abortion was
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assertion that "whatever may be their precise impact, neither the
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone. 29 7
All parties to the adoption process must remain cognizant of the
Court's instruction that constitutional rights apply to all individuals
alike, adults as well as children.
Becker's fourth element requires the specification of the act, forbearance, or benefit owed by the right-regarders to the rightholders.298 The first part of this Article explained that science has
made such progress in the last fifty years that many of the gestational
and genetically linked physical and psychological difficulties that face
adopted children can be foreseen and planned for if the proper information is gathered and appropriately used. 29 9 This Article suggests
that legislation mandating the gathering and use of this health and
genetic information is an appropriate recognition by the state of its duty
to provide such information.
This Article applauds legislatively created duties requiring adoption
agencies to establish a record of the adopted child's health and genetic
history. 300 Further, this Article compliments legislatures for creating
in adoption agencies a privilege of the birth parents to produce this
record. In effect, the legislatures have vested in the birth parents a "no
right" that the adoption agencies not produce such a record. Finally,
legislatures have created a power in the adoptive parents or guardians
of the children to obtain the information from the record holder.
Becker's last analytical element, a specification of the conditions
under which a right claim is sound, 30 ' addresses conditions under
which a child, by its adoptive parents or guardian, may obtain access
to otherwise confidential health and genetic information. This is easier
than some would suggest. The competing interests of adopted chilunconstitutional); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573 (1975) (holding that students were
entitled to notice of changes and opportunity to present their side of the story under the
Due Process Clause when faced with possible suspension from school); h? re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (holding that juveniles, like adults, are constitutionally
entitled, when charged with a violation of criminal law, to proof beyond a reasonable
doubt); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)
(holding that regulation prohibiting students' right to wear an armband as an expression
of opinion was unconstitutional); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 9-14 (1967) (holding that
juveniles enjoy the same rights as adults when they involve issues such as right of
notices of changes, to counsel, to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses and
to privilege against self-incrimination).
297. Gault, 387 U.S. at 13.
298. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
299. See supra part 11.
300. See supra part llI.B.
301. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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dren and the legitimate privacy concerns of birth parents must be
weighed, it is suggested here, not by courts but by the same kind of
community groups that are created to determine matters of community
concern such as zoning, school board policy, and parole.
It is beyond the scope of this analysis to suggest the criteria which
should govern access to health and genetic databases. Existing legislation has addressed this issue in varying ways.3° . Some states may
determine that access to this confidential health data should be limited
to life and death matters such as AIDS or congenital heart disease.
Other states might allow access when maternal drug use is suspected.
Still other legislatures might approve access when schizophrenia, alcoholism, or depression are distinct possibilities. These decisions are
best left to the sound process of debate and consideration at the state
level. Adopted children's need for this information, and the consequences to the quality and duration of their lives absent this information are profound. Adopted children have a right to have this data
collected and made available to them. Considering the vital importance
of this information to the life of the adopted child, states are justified in
creating legislation granting them this right.

302. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.

